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Introduction 
 
1. Motivation and literature review 
1.1 Motivation 
The motivation for this thesis is twofold. The first point is an issue of ongoing 
globalization of trade and financial markets which make the spreading of economic 
situation from one country to another increasingly easy and fast. With that comes the 
problem of growing interdependencies across the countries which influence also 
policymaking process and decisions. The second point concerns the European Union 
accessions of Central and Eastern European countries, their characteristics and 
relations with euro area as well as their obligation for euro adoption. 
While looking at the international spill-overs of the shocks, one usually distinguishes 
monetary policy shocks as well as supply and demand shocks. The conventional 
approach to monetary policy emphasises the domestic macroeconomic stability, 
assuming that achieving it leads to the international stability as well. However, in 
recent years it has become more and more obvious that such an approach does not 
necessarily guarantee a success. Aside of concentrating only on inflation target and 
letting exchange rate float freely, there is also a need to take into consideration 
problems connected to financial stability and cross-border spill-overs of monetary policy 
effects. Monetary policy spill-overs can greatly complicate monetary policymaking 
process, increase volatility of real economy as well as increase financial instability. 
Therefore, it is necessary for the central banks to take into consideration global 
monetary situation while making decisions on their own monetary policy stance. With 
this appears also the problem of monetary autonomy – the question on how much 
central banks can really decide on the domestic interest rates autonomously and how 
much they only follow movements of international interest rates. 
The foreign supply and demand shocks too can have important influence on the 
domestic economic conditions and thus influence the policy decisions of country’s 
authorities. The analysis of foreign macroeconomic situation and potential global risks 
is usually important part of the analysis and forecast on the domestic situation. One of 
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the important determinants of domestic situation is oil and commodity prices. 
Especially, identification of the various sources of oil shocks and their effects on the 
monetary policy decisions and real economy is an important issue. Another point of 
concern is international business cycle fluctuations and the channels of transmission of 
the global shocks to domestic economy. 
The second point motivating my study is the legal obligation for euro adoption in the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Some of the CEE countries have 
already adopted euro, some strive to do that in the near future and even these without 
set target date recursively carry out discussions on the subject. What’s more, the CEE 
countries are mostly relatively open and small economies with close connections with 
euro area which make it plausible for them to be under strong influence of shocks 
spreading from euro area, making them good examples for the subject of global 
spill-overs and interdependencies. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
This thesis bases on the few strands of literature concerning economic 
interdependencies across countries, monetary policy as well as exchange rate markets. 
The literature on international transmission of monetary policy shocks concentrates 
largely on the transmission of US interest rate shocks to different groups of countries. 
Kim (2001) takes the non-US, G-6 countries and presents detailed evidence on the 
effects of US monetary policy and the transmission mechanism behind them, providing 
also evidence on the channels of shocks transmission. Kim and Yang (2012) study the 
transmission of US monetary policy shocks to the East Asian countries while taking 
into consideration their exchange rate regimes and eventual capital controls. Neri and 
Nobili (2010), on the other hand, study transmission of US monetary policy shocks to 
euro area. 
In the connected topic of monetary autonomy and exchange rate regimes, Frankel 
et al. (2004) construct Hendry’s general unrestricted model to examine whether the 
exchange rate regime choice influences sensitivity of local interest rates to the changes 
in international interest rate. As international rate they take the US money market 
rate or the German money market rate in some cases. They find that even in countries 
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with floating exchange rate regimes, the full transmission cannot be rejected in most of 
the countries. Also Shambaugh (2004) checks how countries react to base country 
interest rate changes depending on pegged and non-pegged exchange rate regime but he 
finds some evidence on fixed exchange rate countries following foreign interest rates 
more. 
There exists also a range of studies analysing the monetary policy effects in euro 
area as a whole or its individual countries. Most of them encompass a period prior to 
euro introduction. Peersman and Smets (2001) construct synthetic data for euro area in 
order to derive impulse-response functions for the monetary union as a whole as well as 
individual countries’ output and prices to the identified euro area monetary policy shock. 
They notice that individual country responses to the shock are rather diversified, 
though some common pattern of responses is visible. 
Mojon and Peersman (2001) analyse individual countries for the period 1980-1998. 
They divide countries in respect to their monetary integration with Germany and study 
responses to either domestic or German monetary policy shock. They conclude that if 
take into consideration confidence intervals, the impact of monetary policy shocks on 
output and prices is largely similar across the countries. Peersman (2004), on the other 
hand, takes into consideration spill-over effects across countries while studying the 
impact of common monetary policy shock on chosen euro area member states. He finds 
that output effects are largely similar in the studied countries, while impact on prices 
tends to vary more.  
Angeloni, Ehrmann (2003) analyse the changes in the monetary policy transmission 
in euro area before and after introduction of euro. They present the evidence on positive 
changes taking place in all studied transmission channels: banking, interest rate, and 
asset market. 
The studies on supply and demand shocks’ transmission concentrate on the two main 
issues. One is the influence of oil prices and commodity prices shocks on the domestic 
economies, and especially monetary policy. The second is global business cycle structure 
and distinguishing between external and domestic sources of economic fluctuations. It 
is also connected to the problem of the channels of transmission of the foreign shocks to 
the economies. 
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In the field of oil price shocks, Hamilton (1983) and Hamilton (1996) construct 
empirical model and provide evidence on oil price shocks preceding most of US 
recessions. Kilian (2007) distinguishes three types of oil shocks, depending on their 
source, and presents their effects on real oil prices and thus on US real economy. On the 
other hand, Peersman and Van Robays (2009) examine the effects of various oil prices 
shocks on euro area economy.  
One of the studies that analyses the cross-border transmission of supply and demand 
as well as monetary policy shocks is Canova (2005). Using VAR framework, he studies 
transmission of US structural shocks to Latin America countries, finding that while 
monetary policy shocks affect the economies, supply and demand shocks do not matter 
much for the fluctuations. 
Many of the papers on transmission and correlation of supply and demand shocks 
study these problems in the context of the formation of monetary union. This follows the 
Optimum Currency Area theory that points at the incidence of disruptions as 
determinants of the costs for giving up own monetary policy. 
The Optimum Currency Area theory, introduced by Mundell (1961) and then 
broadened by McKinnon (1963) and Kennen (1969), is an important starting point for 
the second issue in my thesis motivation – the problem of euro adoptions in CEE 
countries. Mundell (1961) states that main benefits from joining monetary union lie in 
elimination of exchange rate fluctuations and lower transaction costs. The costs stem 
from lack of independent monetary policy and of exchange rate as an instrument of 
automatic adjustments after the shocks. What determines the scale of these losses is the 
extent of business cycles correlation across countries forming monetary union. Unless 
the countries are affected by large scaled asymmetric shocks, the inability to pursue 
independent monetary policies does not pose a high risk of loss to the monetary union 
countries. Other factor that can influence the scale of incurred costs is labour mobility 
in the region. 
McKinnon (1963) and Kennen (1969) further develop the theory. McKinnon (1963) 
names openness of the monetary union countries to the intra-regional trade as the 
factor potentially increasing the gains of monetary integration. The reason is that trade 
openness increases the benefits connected to lower transactional costs after common 
10 
 
currency adoption. Kennen (1969), on the other hand, argues that the diversification of 
economy is the crucial aspect to take into consideration while assessing suitability for 
the monetary union. High specialization of the economies forming monetary union 
increases the probability of the asymmetric shocks taking place, therefore magnifying 
the costs of giving up independent monetary policy. 
The literature built on the OCA theory provides also other conditions for the 
monetary union formation and its success. Guiso et al. (1999) name three main 
conditions for the success of the common monetary policy: common ultimate goals 
shared by all MU countries, business cycles synchronization, and similar monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. The problem of common goals is solved with the 
Maastricht Treaty adoption and setting price stability as the ultimate goal for European 
Central Bank. The condition of business cycles synchronization directly follows Mundell 
(1961). What Guiso et al. (1999) add is the issue of similarity in monetary policy 
transmission across the countries. They explain the necessity with the fact that if size 
and timing of response and adjustment differ considerably, it can cause difficulties in 
monetary policy decision-making process and create political tensions due to uneven 
distribution of adjustment costs.  
Probably the most important and one of the first comprehensive analyses on the 
practical application of the OCA theory assumptions is carried out in the study of 
European Commission “One market, one money” (1990). The evaluation names main 
benefits and costs of monetary union formation in Europe: efficiency gains, benefits of 
stable prices, implications for public finance (including the need for its autonomy, 
discipline, and coordination), the cost connected to adjusting to economic shocks without 
nominal exchange rate instrument as well as advantages of euro in the context of 
international environment. It also analyses transitional and spatial impacts of the 
common currency, especially the costs and benefits connected to the transition to EMU, 
regional distribution of effects, and convergence across countries. 
There is also a wide range of research analysing empirically the fulfilment of the 
OCA theory conditions, concentrating mainly but not solely on the European countries. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) construct OCA index based on the few points named 
by the OCA theory – shock asymmetry, trade linkages, and benefits from stable currency. 
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Using this index they assess the level of readiness for EMU in Western European 
countries. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998), on the other hand, show that variables 
mentioned by the OCA theory can be used for explanation of exchange rate volatility 
and intervention across the countries. 
However, most of the empirical studies on the OCA concentrate on business cycles 
synchronization problem. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) study the range of countries 
from Western Europe, East Asia, and North and South America, analysing correlations 
of output and inflation growth as well as supply and demand disturbances. They put 
also emphasis on the sizes and the speed of adjustment to the shocks.  
The studies on the readiness of Central and Eastern European countries to adopt 
euro also concentrate mainly on the business cycles synchronization problem and 
transmission of euro area supply and demand shocks. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) as 
well as Horvath and Ratfai (2004) use Blanchard and Quah (1989) identification 
strategy to identify output and demand shocks and study shock correlations between 
individual euro area countries, euro area as a whole and New Member States (NMS). 
Darvas, Szapáry (2004) study various synchronization measures of business cycles 
between old and new EU member states, with analysis covering GDP and its major 
components. 
To the best of my knowledge, there are only very few studies that analyse the field 
of the transmission of monetary policy shocks form euro area to CEE countries. In one of 
them, Eickmeier and Breitung (2006) construct structural factor model and identify 
euro area supply shock, euro area real demand shock, and common monetary policy 
shock to study cyclical synchronization of euro area and NMS. Jarocinski (2010), on the 
other hand, compares the effects of domestic monetary policy shocks in CEE countries 
with the effects of ECB shocks in euro area.  
There is higher number of studies on domestic monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in CEE countries. Ganev et al. (2002) accounts for the literature review for 
the papers on the subject as well as study reactions to domestic interest rates and 
exchange rate shocks in CEE countries. Coricelli et al. (2006) and Anzuini and Levy 
(2007) provide empirical evidence on the effects of monetary policy shocks in chosen 
CEE countries. Elbourne and de Haan (2006) study the effects of domestic monetary 
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policy in ten CEE countries and check the dependency of these effects magnitude on 
countries’ financial structures. 
One of the main consequences of euro adoption is the loss of independent monetary 
policy. This means no more possibility to use interest rate and exchange rate for 
adjustment after domestic and foreign shocks. To understand well the meaning of the 
loss, it is important to understand the importance of monetary policy, and especially 
exchange rate, in the economic adjustments after the shock. While the OCA theory gives 
exchange rate the role of shock absorber and stabilizer, Kontolemis and Samiei (2000), 
for instance, prove that the opposite holds in case of UK – that exchange rate 
contributes to the economic fluctuations. Artis and Ehrmann (2006) use VAR 
methodology to study four countries: Canada, Denmark, Sweden, and UK. After 
checking the symmetry of disturbances, they examine the role of exchange rate as 
shock-absorber as opposed to sources of own shocks, finding some evidence on the latter 
case holding.  
On the related topic, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) study the actual behaviour of 
exchange rates, reserves, monetary aggregates, interest rates, and commodity prices in 
the wide sample of the countries. They identify existence of the fear of floating – the 
situation in which officially floating exchange rate regime countries do not necessarily 
let their currencies float completely freely. Windberger et al. (2012) confirm these 
observations for CEE countries.  
Summing up, there exists a wide spectrum of the literature on the topics of global 
spill-over of macroeconomic and monetary policy shocks as well as on the costs and 
benefits of euro adoption. However, most of the studies on international transmission 
concentrate on US macroeconomic and monetary policy shocks or oil price shocks, and 
transmission of euro area shocks does not hold as much attention. What’s more, there 
are only a few studies taking into consideration Central and Eastern European 
countries in the context of global shock transmission. 
In case of CEE countries previous studies analyse closely only the problem of 
business cycles synchronization with euro area in the context of future euro adoptions. 
While there are many studies on transmission of supply and demand shocks from euro 
area to Central and Eastern Europe, there are very few studies on the effects of euro 
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area monetary policy changes in these countries. What’s more, most of the studies cme 
from the first half of 2000s and thus are based on data from 1990s and the beginning of 
2000s only.  
The transmission mechanism of domestic monetary policy in CEE countries has been 
thoroughly studied but there exists no explicit study on the role of domestic monetary 
policy – both interest rates and exchange rates – in the transmission of foreign shocks to 
the economy. Analysis on this issue brings important conclusions on the present 
monetary policy making and also provides implications on the costs and benefits of 
joining monetary union and thus giving up independent monetary policy. 
In this thesis I want to fill the shortcomings in the existing literature and provide 
empirical evidence on the issues connected to international transmission of euro area 
shocks, CEE countries dependency on them and the role of domestic monetary policy in 
the transmission. With this analysis I want to provide closer insight on the issues 
related with euro adoption as well as domestic policy making. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. In the second part of the introduction I 
provide short description of the macroeconomic and financial situation in European 
Union member states from Central and Eastern Europe as well as their relations with 
euro area. Then, I move to the empirical analysis. In Chapter 1 I study the transmission 
of euro area output and demand shocks to Central and Eastern European countries. 
Chapter 2 concerns the transmission of euro area monetary policy shocks to Central and 
Eastern European countries. Finally, Chapter 3 contains analysis on the foreign 
exchange rate market situation and the role of domestic monetary policy in 
transmission of euro area shocks to CEE countries. The Appendix adopts the parts of 
analysis from Chapter 3 to the verification of main observations and conclusions from 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Finally, in the Conclusion part I provide summary of the 
results and the implications for euro adoption for each studied country separately.  
 
2. Background of the study 
This thesis takes into consideration Central and Eastern European countries that 
became members of European Union in May 2004 and January 2007. Specifically, I 
study the countries that have not adopted euro as of December 2013: Bulgaria, Czech 
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Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. The three remaining 
countries: Estonia, Slovak Republic, and Slovakia are mentioned in the introduction but 
are excluded from the empirical analysis.  
These countries possess a range of common characteristics. All of them underwent 
the process of system transition in early 1990s. After close to 50 years of the planned 
economy system, they undertook difficult task of transformation and introducing 
market economy. The exact pace and pattern of transition differed across the countries 
but all of them had a common strategic goal of integration with the European Union. 
What’s more, generally speaking the pace of transformation was very fast in all the 
countries and they managed to achieve the full membership in 2004 and 2007.  
Joining European Union is related with accepting the acquis communautaire which 
includes also the obligation for euro adoption as soon as a country fulfils monetary 
union entry conditions, commonly called Maastricht criteria. The criteria are as 
follows:1 
- Price stability – consumer prices inflation rate should not exceed by more than 1.5 
percentage points the rate of inflation in the three best performing EU Member States 
- Sound public finances – government deficit as ratio to GDP should not exceed the 
reference value of 3% 
- Sustainable public finances – government debt as ratio to GDP should not exceed the 
reference value 60% 
- Durability of convergence – long-term interest rate should not exceed by more than 2 
percentage points the rate of the three best performing Member States in terms of price 
stability 
- Exchange rate stability – country’s currency should participate in ERM II for at least 
2 years without severe tensions 
 Out of the CEE countries the first one to adopt common currency was Slovenia in 
January 2007. After that, Slovak Republic followed in January 2009, Estonia in 
January 2011, Latvia in January 2014, and Lithuania in January 2015. The remaining 
countries, until they meet criteria allowing for euro adoption, are referred to as the 
Member States with derogation, and are given the time to make necessary adjustment. 
                                                   
1 Based on the entry on the European Commission website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm 
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The state of the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria as well as detailed analysis of each 
country economic convergence is being monitored by the European Central Bank and 
published in its biannual Convergence Report.2  
As of the Convergence Report from June 2014, the only country meeting all 
convergence criteria was Lithuania. Since the detailed analysis on the present situation 
in CEE countries can be found in the Convergence Report for 2014, I do not describe 
these problems in here. 
The Central and Eastern European countries can be characterized as open, relatively 
small economies and as having very close trade and financial relations with European 
Union and euro area. When it comes to the country size, the population of the 10 CEE 
countries amount to 20.1% of total EU28 population. Out of this, the biggest country in 
the region – Poland has a population of 7.5% of the total EU (for comparison: German 
population amounts to 16.2% of EU28 total, France – 12.5%). Even more remarkable 
differences are observable for GDP level. GDP of the 10 CEE countries as percentage of 
EU28 stands at only 7.67%. The biggest country – Poland has GDP of only 2.9% of the 
total, while the biggest economy Germany possesses a share of 20.6% and 
population-wise most similar country – Spain GDP amounts to 8.2% of the total EU 
GDP.3  
The openness of the economy, measured as a share of country’s exports and imports 
in GDP, is in most of the CEE countries at least as high as and usually even higher than 
in EU15 countries. Romania and Poland are the least open economies; though even in 
these countries the share of trade to GDP oscillates around 80%. In other countries the 
share of trade in GDP exceeds 100%, reaching over 160% in Hungary.4  
The exports and imports with the European Union as a share of total are often 
higher in CEE countries than in the EU as well. The ratio for exports and imports is 
lower than European Union average of around 62% in Bulgaria and Lithuania only. The 
highest share of exports with EU in total exports is achieved in Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic (over 80%) while in case of imports Latvia and Estonia have highest 
ratios (also close to 80%).5 
                                                   
2 The report is published at least once in 2 years or at the request of Member State with derogation 
3 Cited data come from Eurostat and author’s calculations. 
4 Data from Eurostat and author’s calculations. 
5 Data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
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The Central and Eastern European countries are also characterized with close 
relations with euro area. As tables in Chapters 1 and 2 show, in exception of Latvia and 
Lithuania, over the half of countries’ trade is being carried out with euro area countries. 
The share of FDI flows with euro area exceeds 50% in four countries, reaching even the 
level of 75% in Bulgaria. Also portfolio capital flows with euro area account for over 50% 
of total countries’ portfolio flows in all countries but Latvia and Poland.  
However, capital markets in the CEE countries are still largely underdeveloped if 
compared with euro area. The CEE-highest stock market capitalization in Poland at 
level of 36% is still quite low comparing to 52% in euro area. During the peak in year 
2007, euro area stock market capitalization was almost twice of the Polish one. Even 
bigger differences are observable for the amount of corporation securities. While total 
amount of debt securities of corporations issued in euro area accounts for 95% of euro 
area GDP, in Czech Republic and Hungary it barely reaches 30% of GDP, and in 
Lithuania and Romania do not even exceed 1%. Also total sum of credit granted by MFIs 
to non-government residents is much lower in CEE countries than in euro area where it 
accounted for 125% of GDP in 2013. At the same time it was 70% in Bulgaria, 65% in 
Latvia, and over 50% in Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but only 35% in 
Romania.6 
The cited data imply that the CEE countries might potentially find themselves under 
considerable influence of the economic and financial developments in euro area due to 
large share of their trade and capital flows taking place with euro area as a partner. 
What’s more, there still exists a big potential for capital market and banking sector 
development. Especially, corporations’ securities market in largely underdeveloped but 
there is still a field for growth in banking credit as well as stock market areas. 
  
                                                   
6 Data in the paragraph cited after World Bank World Development Indicators database as well as 
ECB Convergence Reports. 
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Chapter 1.                               
Transmission of euro area output and inflation shocks to 
Central and Eastern European countries.         
Problem of business cycles synchronization and 
adjustment to the shocks. 
 
1. Introduction 
The continuing globalization and integration of the trade and financial markets 
increase steadily the cross-country interdependence of the macroeconomic situation. It 
has direct impact on a way in which domestic economic conditions are shaped and thus 
influence domestic economic policies. Due to this, transmission of the economic 
conditions over the borders constitutes for important issue for both policymakers and 
researchers.  
The problem of global spill-overs of macroeconomic situation and business cycles 
synchronization is also widely studied in the context of formation of monetary union. 
Mundell (1961) states that the incidence of shocks affecting the economies as well as the 
speed of adjustment is an important determinant of the scale of the costs connected to 
giving up own monetary policy. Unless the economies are highly affected by 
asymmetrical shocks, inability to use monetary policy and exchange rate for shock 
adjustment has not harsh effects on the economy. 
In this chapter I study business cycles synchronization problem in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries that are members of European Union but have not 
adopted euro yet. The studied CEE countries are mostly relatively small and open 
economies with close trade and financial ties with euro area. Such characteristics make 
them potentially vulnerable to the transmission of euro area macroeconomic conditions 
to domestic economies and stand for the important reason for studying transmission of 
euro area, and not global, shocks to these countries. With EU accession the CEE 
countries are also legally obliged to adopt euro in the future. Recently, euro adoption 
took place in Latvia (January 2014) and Lithuania (January 2015) and in some other 
countries the discussions on the subject are recursively coming back even though the 
outbreak of euro area crisis halted the prospects of prompt euro adoption. 
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Based on this background, I analyse the problem of transmission of euro area 
output and inflation shocks to CEE countries. I compare the effects of the shocks in each 
country with aggregate euro area effect, informing about the relative size and the speed 
of adjustment to the shocks. Additionally, I provide information on the incidence of the 
shocks with the analysis of correlation of output growth and inflation rates as well as 
output and inflation shocks.  
Studying the effects of foreign real shocks on domestic economy has important 
implications. First, the knowledge on the effects of euro area shocks on CEE economies 
is useful for the countries’ central banks and other economic policy-making authorities. 
While analysing domestic economic situation and making decisions on the economic 
policies, the authorities have to take into consideration all variables plausible for the 
task. The scale of effects of foreign variables on the domestic economy and the speed of 
adjustments is informative for the usefulness of developments in euro area for domestic 
economy analysis, policy making, and forecasting. 
What’s more, the extent to which CEE countries are affected by euro area shocks is 
important for future euro adoptions. The speed and the magnitude of reactions of 
domestic variables to euro area output and inflation shocks as well as the correlations 
inform about the problem of business cycle synchronization, the problem underlined by 
the OCA theory. For monetary union to be sustainable, countries should not be affected 
by asymmetrical shocks which make carrying out of common monetary policy difficult 
since it cannot fit well countries with divergent business cycles. Therefore, I consider 
responses to euro area output and inflation shocks that are consistent with aggregate 
euro area reactions as important condition for future success of enlarged euro area. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains empirical model 
and data description. Section 3 reports correlation analysis and VAR model empirical 
analysis results. Section 4 looks for the potential determinants of the achieved results. 
Section 5 concludes and provides policy implications.  
 
2. Empirical methodology and data 
This section presents the empirical model used to analyse the effects of euro area 
output and inflation shocks in chosen European Union countries from Central and 
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Eastern Europe as well as country sample and data. The empirical methodology is 
based on the VAR framework.  
 
2.1 Empirical model 
The basis of the identification strategy is an assumption that euro area variables 
are not influenced by any variables of a single country from Central and Eastern 
Europe. I think that such an assumption is plausible since most of the countries of the 
region are relatively small compared to the euro area as a whole.7 While the situation 
in some non-euro Central European countries might affect macroeconomic variables of 
neighbouring small euro area countries, like Estonia or Slovakia, it is hard to believe it 
can have any influence on the average euro area data.  
Based on such assumptions, I construct structural block-exogenous VAR model of 
the representation (following Cushman and Zha (1997), Kim and Yang (2012)): 
𝐺(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 
where: G(L) = [
𝐺11(𝐿) 0
𝐺21(𝐿) 𝐺22(𝐿)
], 𝑦𝑡 =[
𝑦1𝑡
𝑦2𝑡
],  𝑒𝑡= [
𝑒1𝑡
𝑒2𝑡
], 
G(L) is matrix polynomial in lag operator L. Vector yt constitutes of endogenous 
variables: y1t is vector of euro area variables, y2t is vector of CEE countries variables. 𝑒𝑡 
is vector of structural disturbances. G12(L) = 0 is a restriction of block-exogeneity which 
means that y1t is not affected by current as well as lagged values of y2t.  
 The reduced-form of the VAR model has the representation: 
𝑦𝑡 = B(L)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
where: B(L) = [
𝐵11(𝐿) 0
𝐵21(𝐿) 𝐵22(𝐿)
], 𝑦𝑡 =[
𝑦1𝑡
𝑦2𝑡
],  𝑢𝑡= [
𝑢1𝑡
𝑢2𝑡
] 
B(L) is matrix polynomial in lag operator L. Vector yt constitutes for endogenous 
variables: y1t is vector of euro area variables, y2t is vector of CEE countries variables. ut 
is a vector of serially uncorrelated reduced-form disturbances with a mean zero and a 
covariance matrix Σu. I use Choleksy decomposition of the reduced-form covariance 
matrix to identify structural innovations. 
                                                   
7 The only possible exception, I believe, might be Poland, being the largest economy in Central and 
Eastern Europe and population-wise the 6th largest country in the European Union. However, for the 
sake of uniformity of our identification strategy for all the countries and, therefore, also the easiness of 
comparisons, we maintain our basic assumption also for this country. 
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Because explanatory variables differ in some equations of the VAR equation system, 
OLS estimations provide inefficient estimates. Thus, I use seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) method to estimate the reduced form block-exogenous model. 
Thanks to such identification method, the identified euro area shocks are identical 
for all the countries under consideration which greatly facilitates cross-country 
comparison. It also has an advantage of saving degrees of freedom as compared to the 
full two-country model. 
 
2.2 Data description 
First, I construct a block of euro area variables which we use to identify the euro 
area shocks. I follow Peersman and Smets (2001) and include in the block data for euro 
area aggregate output, inflation, money market short term interest rate and real 
effective exchange rate. I also add one more variable to the system – economic 
sentiment survey data – in order to control for market sentiments. The market 
sentiments provide information not only about present situation but also about future 
expectations of market players towards economic situation. As central banks are 
supposed to look not only at past variables but also at their forecasts, I believe that 
including market economic sentiment data helps in controlling for these future values. 
What’s more, according to European Central Bank’s institutional framework, it takes 
into consideration various economic variables, that can be useful for price level 
forecasting, while deciding on its policy stance. Since it would be impossible to include 
in the VAR specification all the variables that ECB might be taking into consideration, I 
assume that economic sentiment data account for good summary of all these data. 
Therefore, I have a five-variable euro area block with the ordering being: output, 
inflation, economic sentiment indicator, short term interest rate, and real effective 
exchange rate to identify the euro area structural monetary policy and macroeconomic 
shocks.  
In the next step, I construct very similar block for each CEE country. Basing on the 
previous studies, e.g. Ganev et al. (2002), the block for each CEE consists of domestic 
output, inflation, money market short term interest rate, and exchange rate to euro.  
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In each VAR specification I also include additional variables exogenous to both euro 
area and domestic blocks: world commodity price index and US short-term nominal 
interest rate. The purpose is to control for the world economic and monetary 
developments that are independent from both euro area and CEE countries but 
influence them and may be responsible for the comovements in the two regions.  
Inclusion of exogenous variables is a practice in many VAR specifications and the 
literature justifies it with a need of controlling for changes in the world demand and 
inflation. This necessity comes from the “price puzzle” problem, i.e. the situation in 
which after positive interest rate shock the VAR model results point at price level 
increase. Sims (1992) argues that such a problem may stem from the fact that central 
bank has more information about predicted future inflation than is included in simple 
VAR and proposes inclusion of exogenous variables (commodity price index in his case) 
as a means to at least partially solve this problem. Many VARs for euro area include 
also US output and federal funds rate (e.g. Peersman and Smets (2001)) as well. 
Introducing federal funds rate as exogenous variables has one more important 
implication – it helps to control for changes in US monetary policy, which affect both 
euro area and CEE countries, and thus concentrate on the transmission of the pure 
ECB shocks.  
All the data I use is of monthly frequency. The indicator of output is industrial 
production index excluding construction. Inflation is measured with harmonized index 
of consumer prices (HICP), all-items index. Interest rate used in case of euro area is 
average monthly observations of EONIA. For CEE countries we use monthly averages 
of day-to-day money market interest rates. The real effective exchange rate of euro area 
is based on consumer price indices of 42 trading partners as deflator. The exchange rate 
towards euro is formed as price in national currency for 1 euro. The economic sentiment 
in euro area is measured with Economic Sentiment Indicator, being a weighted average 
of the components of the confidence indicators for industry, services, consumers, 
construction, and retail trade provided by European Commission DG ECFIN. The data 
for euro area are taken from ECB databases, while the data for CEE countries come 
from Eurostat. Only data on industrial production for Czech Republic are taken from 
IMF IFS database. As for the world variables I use All Commodity Price Index including 
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both fuel and non-fuel price indices from IMF and US federal funds effective rate taken 
from Datastream.  
All data are seasonally adjusted and in their logarithms (except for interest rates) 
and in levels. Therefore, I allow for implicit co-integration relationships in the data. 
However, as Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) state, I still am able to achieve consistent 
estimates of the parameters. 
I estimate all VAR models with 4 lags. The value was chosen based on Akaike 
statistic run for the euro area block specification. Admittedly, the theory points at 
longer lag order, as central banks are supposed to take into consideration data from the 
period longer than only last four months. However, the sample periods are quite short 
and there is a large number of coefficients to be estimated in each equation, so with the 
choice of longer lag order I would run out of degrees of freedom fast.  
The country sample contains of seven CEE countries that became EU member 
states in May 2004 and January 2007 but have not adopted euro yet: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.8 Sample period for all the 
countries start in February 2002. I unify the sample periods for all the countries in 
order to facilitate comparisons across the countries. At the same time, the starting date 
is chosen such as all countries’ samples do not include changes in exchange rate regime.  
 
3. Empirical results 
This section presents results of the empirical study. First, I carry out correlation 
analysis for output and inflation growth rates as well as the shocks between each 
individual CEE country and euro area as a whole. Next, I present the impulse response 
functions for each country output and inflation after euro area macroeconomic shocks. I 
analyse countries’ responses as well as compare them with the euro area aggregate 
responses. 
 
 
                                                   
8 As the data I use end in year 2013, I include to the non-euro CEE countries also Latvia which 
adopted euro in January 2014. 
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3.1 Growth rates and shocks correlations 
The incidence of disturbances affecting countries aiming to form monetary union is 
an important issue to take into consideration. Therefore, first I study the correlations of 
output and inflation growth rates as well as output and inflation shocks between each 
country and euro area as a whole. I believe that using euro area as a reference, instead 
of individual countries, is justified by the fact of ECB using the aggregate values for the 
policy decisions.9 
Table 1-1 presents correlation coefficients for output and prices growth rates. 
Output growth correlations in all studied CEE countries are very high. They range from 
61% in Lithuania to 93% in Hungary. Correlations of inflation rates are much lower 
than correlations of output. Inflation rates show highest correlations in Czech Republic 
(65%) as well as Bulgaria (60%), and relatively high in Latvia (53%) and Lithuania 
(46%). It is much lower in other countries (29% in Hungary, 23% in Poland, 21% in 
Romania). This shows that while output developments might have similar pattern in 
both euro area and CEE countries, the price changes differ considerably, pointing at the 
potential problem for common monetary policy and its fitting the economic situation in 
all monetary union member states. 
 
Table 1-1. Output growth and inflation rates correlations.  
Country Euro area output Euro area inflation 
Bulgaria 0.7940 0.6029 
Czech Republic 0.8815 0.6544 
Hungary 0.9331 0.2902 
Latvia 0.8376 0.5348 
Lithuania 0.6122 0.4690 
Poland 0.7591 0.2339 
Romania 0.7531 0.2130 
Next, I use VAR models for euro area and CEE countries in order to identify 
structural innovations to output and inflation and check the pairwise correlations with 
euro area. Table 1-2 presents the achieved values of coefficients. The results are highly 
diversified. The first and main observation is that shock correlations being considerably 
                                                   
9 There still remains a problem that euro area aggregate values will change after new monetary union 
accessions. However, I believe that problem to be slight as, in exception of Poland, all the studied 
countries are relatively small and thus, possess very low weights in the euro area average values. 
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lower than growth rate correlations in all the countries. 
 
Table 1-2. Output and inflation shocks’ correlations. 
Country Euro area output shock Euro area inflation shock 
Bulgaria 0.1739 -0.2015 
Czech Republic 0.1600 -0.2788 
Hungary 0.1982 -0.1517 
Latvia 0.1822 -0.0078 
Lithuania 0.0530 0.1042 
Poland 0.3681 0.1333 
Romania -0.1939 0.0306 
In case of the correlations of euro area output shock with domestic output shocks, 
there is negative correlation coefficient in Romania. In other countries the correlation is 
positive but rather low. The highest value is observed in Poland but even it reaches only 
37%. In other countries it ranges from 5% in Lithuania to 20% in Hungary. Correlations 
of inflation shocks are even lower. In as much as four countries, the coefficient sign is 
negative. Only in Lithuania, Romania, and Poland the value is positive, with the 
highest level at 13% in Poland.  
Finally, the correlation results show that there is no direct connection between 
growth rates’ and shocks’ correlation. For instance, while Poland is a country with 
highest shocks’ co-movements with euro area, the growth rates correlation are one of 
the lowest out of considered countries. 
The previous research on the subject provides highly mixed results on the level of 
correlation as well as relative differences and ordering of the countries. Though, they 
usually point at the lowest correlations in case of Romania and highest in Hungary 
which is largely consistent with my results. 
Specifically, Fidrmuc, Korhonen (2003) in the study for the second half of 1990s 
point at high GDP correlation with euro area taking place in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia 
while low in Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Inflation correlations are 
much lower than output correlations for all the countries, with highest values in Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Czech Republic. All these coefficients are also lower than calculated by 
me. When it comes to shock correlations, they are much lower than for the variables’ 
growth rates and are highest in case of supply shocks in Hungary (0.46) and Latvia 
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(0.30) and in case of demand shocks in Poland (0.28) and Hungary (0.25), and almost 
zero or negative in other countries. 
Artis et al. (2005) use sample for years 1993-2004 to check correlation of industrial 
production annual growth rate. They find highest coefficients in Hungary and Poland, 
lower in Czech Republic and negative in Latvia and Lithuania (no analysis for Bulgaria 
and Romania). These results are very similar to the ones from Eickmeier, Breitung 
(2006) on output growth correlations, with highest values in Hungary and Poland, and 
negative for Latvia. They also study inflation growth correlations and find highest 
levels in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Many previous studies (e.g. Savva 2010, Eickmeier and Breitung 2006, Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen 2003) point at the fact that correlation of growth rates as well as the shocks 
may change with the time as Central and Eastern European countries become more and 
more integrated with the European Union. Thus, they check correlation coefficients for 
the two separate periods of late 1990s and beginning of 2000s and usually observe the 
expected increase in the correlation. In this study I concentrate on the data starting in 
2000s, thus most of the sample contains period just before and already after European 
Union accession. Therefore, I do not compare the correlations before and after EU 
membership. Instead, I check how the co-movements in output and inflation have been 
changing after the countries became European Union members. For this, I study 
two-year moving correlations for output and inflation growth. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 
present the respective plots. For the easiness of comparisons, correlations for all the 
countries start in January 2003, basing on the growth rates data from January 2001. 
First, output growth moving correlations imply that in some countries the slight 
increasing trend in the co-movements with euro area output growth is visible in the first 
few years after EU accession. However, the correlation coefficients differ significantly 
across the countries with the lowest, and negative at times, values in Lithuania and 
Latvia and highest in Czech Republic and Poland. Starting from the beginning of 2007 
fall in correlation in all the countries can be observed, with minimum achieved at the 
beginning of 2008. Then, starting from the second half of 2008 correlation coefficients 
rise rapidly and stay at very high levels in all the countries. These two changes can be 
associated with the global financial crisis that started in Western Europe earlier than in 
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Central and Eastern Europe, thus bringing fall in output correlations. Then, when the 
crisis and economic slowdown spread to CEE countries, the correlations became very 
high. Such situation lasted until second half of year 2011 when CEE countries started 
growing faster than euro area as a whole, causing correlation coefficients to fall. After a 
short increase, the correlation coefficients started falling even more in year 2013, 
pointing at continued slowdown in euro area and faster growth in CEE countries. 
 
Figure 1-1. Moving correlations for output growth in CEE countries.
 
The moving correlation developments for inflation rate are harder to interpret. 
Figure 2 implies that inflation correlations tend to change frequently and vary 
significantly across the countries. Again, for few countries the growing trend can be 
observed between 2004 and 2008. Similarly to the output growth, the common increase 
in correlation in the second half of 2008 can be observed. In this case, however, the 
period of high co-movements is much shorter in some of the countries, especially Poland, 
and does not include Hungary. Furthermore, while output correlations in year 2013 
tend to decrease, for inflation the opposite is taking place. The growing correlations of 
inflation growth rates most probably point at the deflationary pressures spreading 
across the continent. 
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Figure 1-2. Moving correlations for inflation rates in CEE countries. 
 
Summing up, while studying moving correlation of output and inflation growth 
rates, I am able to draw interesting observations and conclusions on the economic 
developments in euro area and CEE countries. However, it provides also some insight 
into the studied in this chapter problem of business cycles synchronization. First, in few 
cases there seems to be growing trend in the correlation changes in the first years after 
EU accession. However, financial crisis outbreak stopped further development. Second, 
correlations of the variables’ growth rates tend to increase during the periods of the 
increased economic turmoil. In normal times, however, they change frequently and in 
some countries are often far from being high. It implies that while in the long run and 
crisis periods business cycles and inflation changes are well synchronized, facilitating 
the central bank monetary policy decisions, it is not necessarily the case in the short run. 
Moreover, in 2013, while big differences in the output growth can be observed between 
euro area and CEE countries, what can potentially help the common monetary policy is 
the fact that deflationary pressures seem to spread similarly across both euro area and 
the neighbouring CEE countries. 
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3.2 Effects of euro area output and inflation shocks 
Next, I present the impulse response functions of CEE domestic variables to euro 
area output and inflation shocks. This analysis allows drawing conclusions regarding 
dependence of these economies on economic developments in the neighbouring common 
currency area.  
Similarity of the direction of responses to the shocks is an important aspect for 
business cycles synchronization problem. However, as Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) 
state, while considering the responses to the shocks not only their correlations but also 
the size of the effect and the speed of adjustment is important. Even if responses to the 
shocks between two countries are weakly or negatively correlated, the cost of such 
differences might still not be high if the size of the shocks is small. Incurred costs 
change also with the speed with which economy adjusts to the shocks. Faster responses 
of the economic variables can considerably lower the costs of giving up independent 
monetary policy and exchange rate. Therefore, aside from the direction of reactions I 
pay attention to and compare also the size and the speed of adjustment to the euro area 
shocks. 
Figures 1-3a-d present impulse response functions for the output and inflation after 
euro area output and inflation shocks. The blue solid lines indicate responses of each 
country variables to the shocks while red solid lines present aggregate euro area 
reactions. Dotted lines constitute for 90% confidence bands of each impulse response 
function.  
First, I describe shortly the responses of aggregate euro area variables to euro area 
shocks. After positive output shock, euro area aggregate output increases at impact and 
then slowly goes down to zero, reaching it around one year after the shock. Inflation also 
increases slightly for few months after the shock with the reaction dying out before two 
years pass. After euro area inflation shock the aggregate output reacts with a few 
months lag and records small fall lasting for around a year. Inflation increases at 
impact and the reaction dies out very slowly, still being positive and statistically 
significant 36 months after the shock. These patterns of reaction are largely consistent 
with the responses after output and inflation shocks presented in previous studies. For 
instance, Sims and Zha (2006), even though studying the role of monetary policy, 
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present derived impulse response functions for all kinds of the shocks for US. The 
output responses to inflation shocks and inflation responses to output shocks are 
similar the ones I present for euro area. 
When it comes to CEE countries’ reactions to euro area shock, after positive output 
shock I observe instant increase in output in all CEE countries. The exact size, the 
persistence of that increase as well as the shape of the function, i.e. is the way of 
adjustment to the shock, differ slightly across the countries but the responses are 
usually not significantly different from the aggregate euro area reaction. Output 
increase is higher than euro area output rise in case of Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
i.e. fixed exchange rate regime countries as well as Hungary for the short period after 
the shock. In other cases country response is slightly smaller than aggregate euro area 
one.  
 
Figure 1-3a. Responses of CEE countries’ output to euro area output shock 
 
Note: solid lines: impulse response functions (blue – responses of each country’s variable; red – 
response of aggregate euro area variable); dotted lines: bootstrapped 90% confidence bands 
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After euro area positive output shock euro area inflation increases slightly for 
around two years after which the response is practically zero. On the other hand, in 
most of the CEE countries inflation falls for a considerable period of time. In Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Romania inflation increases for the first few 
months after the shock, with the magnitude of increase being comparable to the euro 
area one. After that, however, inflation starts falling, recovering in Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic and Hungary only. In Hungary and Romania as well as Lithuania and Poland 
the fall in inflation lasts until the end of the considered period. Even though the 
direction of CEE responses often differs when compared to euro area, the differences are 
usually not significant (with short exception in Bulgaria). The main reason for that are 
the very wide confidence bands on CEE countries’ inflation responses, showing that it is 
hard to anticipate the actual inflation changes after euro area output shocks. 
 
Figure 1-3b. Responses of CEE countries’ inflation to euro area output shock 
 
Note: as figure 1-3a 
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The euro area inflation shock causes slight fall in aggregate monetary union output 
which starts few months after the shock and recovers in around two years. CEE 
countries react differently. In all the countries increase in output can be observed and in 
many cases the difference with euro area response is statistically significant. What’s 
more, the adjustment to the shocks is largely similar across the countries. In exception 
of Hungary and Poland the response reaches peak in the first 10 months after the shock 
and then slowly goes down. In the two remaining countries output grows slower and the 
reaction is more persistent. When it comes to the magnitude of response, the highest 
average output increase takes place in Poland and Romania, making these countries 
bear potentially highest costs for the differences in reactions as compared to euro area. 
 
Figure 1-3c. Responses of CEE countries’ output to euro area inflation shock 
 
Note: as figure 1-3a 
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similar to the aggregate euro area one, both when it comes to the shape and magnitude 
of reaction. Inflation increases fast in the first months after the shock and then slowly 
goes down. Hungary and Poland show different patterns with inflation increasing much 
slower and the reaction staying more persistent. These two countries also show highest 
average increases in inflation after the shocks. In Bulgaria and Romania inflation falls 
for the first few months after the shock and then increases persistently in a manner 
similar to Hungary and Poland.  
 
Figure 1-3d. Responses of CEE countries’ inflation to euro area inflation shock 
 
Note: as figure 1-3a 
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inflation after euro area inflation shock are rather similar to aggregate euro area 
responses. In the remaining cases – responses of inflation to euro area output shock and 
output to euro area inflation shock, CEE countries often react in the opposite direction 
to euro area as a whole. Especially, the differences in the latter case are clear and 
frequently statistically significant. Inflation seems to behave better, though at the same 
time there is much larger uncertainty about the exact direction and magnitude of its 
responses. 
The results on the subject presented by the literature provide no consensus.  
Darvas and Szapary (2005) analyse GDP responses to common factor euro area shocks 
and find highest responses in Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary (and Slovenia), and 
counter-cyclical ones in Latvia and Lithuania. On the other hand, Korhonen (2003) 
reports highest influence of euro area output shocks in Latvia, rather high in other CEE 
countries, and opposite reaction taking place in Romania only. Eickmeier and Breitung 
(2006) study responses of CEE countries’ output and inflation to euro area supply and 
demand shocks. They note first that standard deviations of shocks responses in CEE 
countries are larger than the ones of EMU countries and that many responses are not 
significantly different from zero. Even though for some countries opposite or 
considerably smaller reactions take place, as encouraging they state the fact that most 
of CEE country reactions also do not significantly differ from aggregate euro area 
response functions. These observations are highly consistent with the results provided 
in this section. 
 
4. Determinants of euro area shocks’ influence 
Up to now I concentrated on the effects of euro area output and inflation shocks in seven 
CEE countries. From now on, I try to explain the differences occurring across the 
countries with the characteristics regarding CEE countries’ trade and financial markets. 
Specifically, I look for the determinants of euro area shocks effects’ in CEE countries 
taking into consideration three main categories: country’s overall openness, country’s 
relations to euro area, country’s banking and financial markets depth. Table 1-3 
presents variables for each category together with their definitions and sources. The 
data are sample periods averages of annual data for each country.  
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Table 1-3. Variables used as potential determinants for explaining effects of euro area monetary policy 
shocks in CEE countries. 
Variable name Definition Source 
Country’ openness 
Trade openness Sum of country’s exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP 
IMF IFS and author’s 
calculations 
Kaopen Chinn and Ito index on capital market 
openness 
Chinn and Ito (2011) 
Relations with euro area 
Exports Exports to euro area, as a percentage of total 
country exports 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Imports Imports to euro area, as a percentage of total 
country imports 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Inward FDI Inward direct investment coming from euro 
area, as a percentage of total country inward 
FDI 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Outward FDI Outward direct investment flowing to euro 
area, as a percentage of total country 
outward FDI  
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Portfolio 
liabilities 
Portfolio investment liabilities connected to 
euro area, as a percentage of total 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Portfolio assets Portfolio investment assets connected to 
euro area, as a percentage of total 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Trade Exports and imports to euro area, as a 
percentage of total country trade 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
FDI  Inward and outward direct investment 
coming from and flowing to euro area, as a 
percentage of total country FDI flows 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Portfolio Portfolio investment assets and liabilities 
connected to euro area, as a percentage of 
total 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Financial markets depth and characteristics 
Capitalization Stock market capitalization, as a percentage 
to GDP 
World Bank 
Corporation 
securities 
Debt securities of corporations, as a 
percentage to GDP 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
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MFI credit MFI credit to non-government residents, as 
a percentage to GDP 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Claims of euro 
area MFIs 
Deposits and debt securities issued by 
domestic MFIs held by euro area MFIs as a 
percentage of total liabilities of domestic 
MFIs 
ECB Convergence 
Report 
Foreign claims Claims on non-residents held by depository 
institutions, as a percentage to total assets 
IMF IFS and author’s 
calculations 
Since my country sample consists of only seven countries, I am unable to carry out 
regression analysis in order to calculate beta coefficients and study their statistical 
significance. Thus, I turn to descriptive analysis to discern potential determinants. In 
order to carry out the analysis I present the aforementioned results in the form of 
numerical values and present them along with the potential determinant variables in 
Tables 1-4a and 1-4b. First columns contain differences between euro area and domestic 
monetary policy influence in the 24th month after the shock as a relative magnitude of 
the shocks effects10. The following ones present the considered country characteristics. 
Starting with the output responses to euro area output shocks, the data imply that 
especially trade relations with euro area might explain the spread between individual 
country and aggregate euro area response. As might be expected, higher trade share 
with euro area in total trade diminishes the difference in responses. That result holds 
for both export and import transactions. The economic boom in euro area means 
increased demand on the imported goods and services. With euro area being the most 
important trade partner for CEE countries, this leads also to higher production and 
economic boom in CEE countries. The higher share of trade goes to euro area, the more 
euro area situation influences individual CEE country and the more similar the 
economic conditions become. 
What’s more, also FDI inflows from euro area seem to influence the gap in the 
shock reaction, with higher flows narrowing the distance. The boom in euro area might 
mean more free capital and thus higher FDI flows to the CEE countries, increasing 
their domestic investment, demand, and contributing to the economic growth.  
                                                   
10 While the choice of the period of response is arbitrary, the main observations do not change 
considerably even if other period of response is used. What’s more, using average responses of CEE 
countries’ variables also allows for very similar conclusions. 
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When it comes to inflation responses to euro area output shocks, the difference 
between individual country and aggregate euro area response seems to be driven 
mainly by FDI relations with euro area. The higher the share of FDI flows with euro 
area in total country FDI flows, the higher the reaction of individual country inflation is 
as compared to aggregate euro area response.  
Higher share of exports with euro area in total exports also seems to be associated 
with inflation in CEE countries increasing more as compared to the euro area response. 
It can be explained with the possible increase in import demand due to boom in euro 
area. Higher demand on domestic goods has positive influence on output and can also 
cause price increases in CEE countries. 
When it comes to responses to euro area inflation shocks, almost no clear relations 
between responses and country characteristics can be observed. Only in case of output 
response, it seems that higher trade openness of the economy relates to smaller gap 
between aggregate euro area and individual country responses. High trade openness 
means closer overall integration with the world. If linking it with large part of trade 
taking place with euro area, open economy means high ratio of trade with euro area to 
GDP and therefore high transmission of euro area economic situation to CEE countries. 
That trade openness explains output responses after inflation shocks better than 
inflation ones can be connected to the higher correlation of output growth rather than 
inflation. 
Summing up, trade and FDI relations with euro area seem to be the most 
important determinants for the shock effects in CEE countries. This result validates 
statements from previous studies, like Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) or Eickmeier and 
Breitung (2006) that also name trade and FDI as important factors for business cycles 
linkages. On the other hand, neither financial markets development nor overall country 
openness seems to play an important role for transmission of euro area output and 
inflation changes. 
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Table 1-4a. Differences between individual country and euro area responses to the shocks together with variables describing country relations with euro area. 
 
EA output shock 
EA inflation 
shock 
Relations with euro area 
 
Output 
Infla- 
tion 
Output 
Infla- 
tion 
Export Import 
Inward 
FDI 
Outwar
d FDI 
Portfo- 
lio liab. 
Portfo- 
lio 
assets 
Trade FDI 
Portfo- 
lio 
Bulg. 0.145 0.057 0.125 0.187 48.957 44.271 68.771 46.562 66.683 47.267 46.614 57.666 56.975 
Czech 
Rep. 
0.018 0.054 0.155 0.130 67.807 63.114 82.007 67.343 50.750 65.967 65.461 74.675 58.358 
Hung. -0.007 -0.014 0.223 0.334 60.985 54.885 68.531 35.600 64.258 57.933 57.935 52.065 61.096 
Latvia 0.156 -0.131 0.216 0.140 33.623 42.154 39.631 20.669 74.464 21.283 37.888 30.150 47.873 
Lith. 0.121 -0.034 0.190 0.069 40.033 39.808 38.058 49.000 73.891 66.456 39.921 43.529 70.173 
Poland -0.021 -0.004 0.504 0.220 57.071 57.000 74.293 42.021 50.492 38.008 57.036 58.157 44.250 
Rom. -0.008 -0.019 0.313 0.251 55.633 52.158 79.373 14.456 67.182 72.936 53.896 46.914 70.059 
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Table 1-4b. Differences between individual country and euro area responses to the shocks together with variables describing country financial market 
developments and overall openness. 
 EA output shock EA inflation shock Financial market characteristics  Openness 
 
Output 
Infla- 
tion 
Output 
Infla- 
tion 
Stock market 
capitalization 
Corporation 
securities 
MFI 
credit 
Claims 
of euro 
area 
MFIs 
Foreign 
claims 
Trade 
openness 
Kaopen 
Bulg. 0.145 0.057 0.125 0.187 15.267 2.264 49.236 15.371 14.086 121.103 0.638 
Czech 
Rep. 
0.018 0.054 0.155 0.130 23.106 24.186 43.708 6.400 15.301 136.853 1.945 
Hung. -0.007 -0.014 0.223 0.334 23.313 19.600 54.950 18.618 8.488 146.761 2.281 
Latvia 0.156 -0.131 0.216 0.140 8.489 1.692 65.208 11.400 23.750 99.501 2.358 
Lith. 0.121 -0.034 0.190 0.069 18.494 1.983 46.300 12.700 12.204 120.464 2.175 
Poland -0.021 -0.004 0.504 0.220 28.227 8.431 40.277 8.650 5.938 74.453 -0.141 
Rom. -0.008 -0.019 0.313 0.251 11.318 1.100 35.000 26.657 3.106 74.783 1.832 
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5. Conclusions and implications 
In this chapter I employ VAR methodology in order to study empirically the 
dependence of CEE economies on changes in euro area macroeconomic conditions. The 
results point at euro area output and inflation shocks being important drivers of 
changes in domestic variables. Although some reactions of CEEs variables to these 
shocks are dissimilar to the aggregate euro area responses, many similar patterns also 
can be observed.  
The results of the analysis allow drawing important conclusions and implications 
for both present domestic monetary and economic policies as well as future euro 
adoptions. First, the results imply that central banks as well as other economic 
authorities should carefully take into consideration euro area economic situation for 
analysis of domestic economic conditions and making forecasts on future developments. 
They show also that prudential economic policies might not be enough to assure 
domestic macroeconomic stability, especially in the times of the world economic unrest.  
The analysis provides also implications regarding future euro adoptions in Central 
and Eastern European countries. High correlations of output growth rates can serve as 
argument for euro adoption in most CEE countries. At the same time, however, low 
levels of inflation rates’ as well as macroeconomic shocks’ correlations speak against 
euro adoptions. Though it is partly reassuring for common monetary policy that even 
low on average inflation correlations become much higher in the periods of crisis as well 
as in the time of deflationary pressures. 
When it comes to the responses of macroeconomic variables to euro area output and 
inflation shocks, usually strong influence of the latter and many similar adjustment 
patterns can serve as argument for euro adoptions. The biggest difference in responses, 
when output reacts significantly in the opposite direction to euro area output after euro 
area inflation shock, might pose some problems after euro adoption. However, as ECB’s 
main policy objective lies in inflation stability, the problem should not be too severe. 
Divergent inflation responses can pose potentially bigger problems after euro 
adoption, with the common monetary policy not being able to fit divergent inflation 
cycles. However, even leaving the direction of response aside, the uncertain changes in 
inflation rate after macroeconomic shocks can make implementation of common 
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monetary policy challenging.  
This situation, however, might also be more harmful to CEE countries than ECB 
policy making process. ECB might not change its policy even after CEE countries adopt 
euro due to relatively small size of these economies. That means ECB’s monetary policy 
decisions often not fitting economic situation in the countries well, leading to further 
destabilization of the economy.  
Finally, the study on the determinants of domestic output and inflation responses 
to euro area macroeconomic shocks imply that higher trade relations and FDI flows 
with euro area lead to more similar magnitude of responses as compared to euro area as 
a whole. That is, assuming further economic integration with the euro area, e.g. due to 
euro adoption (the endogeneity of OCA, described by Frankel and Rose (1997) and Rose 
(2000)), there exists possibility that the magnitude of influence and the process of 
adjustment to the shocks becomes even more similar in the future, facilitating future 
common monetary policy and dispelling some of the cross-country tensions. 
The study in this chapter has also important limitations. First, I am using the past 
data in order to infer about future developments. Second, I am assuming that 
transmission mechanisms as well as euro area aggregate shocks do not change after 
euro adoptions in CEE countries. While small size of these economies may support 
assumption on barely changing euro area aggregate data and ECB monetary policy 
patterns, the transmission mechanism in CEE countries can undergo important 
transformations changing also the effects of the euro area macroeconomic shocks in 
these countries. 
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Chapter 2.                               
Transmission of euro area monetary policy shocks to 
Central and Eastern European countries.          
Implications for monetary autonomy and euro adoptions. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the first chapter I studied the effects of euro area output and inflation shocks in 
the countries from Central and Eastern Europe. As mentioned before, the business 
cycles synchronization is an important topic in studies on global economic integration 
and a widely-studied aspect of the readiness for monetary union formation. However, in 
the field of international economics the global spill-overs of monetary policy effects also 
draw a lot of attention. That is especially true for the effects of US monetary policy. 
However, it seems plausible that European Central Bank’s (ECB) policy influence also 
goes beyond euro area borders. Especially, the neighbouring countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) seem to be susceptible to such spill-overs due to factors such as 
their close trade and financial ties with the euro area, relative small size and relatively 
high openness of these economies.  
Based on this background, the main aim of this chapter is to investigate the effects 
of euro area monetary policy shocks on CEE economies. I concentrate on the three main 
aspects: strength of ECB’s policy impact as compared to the domestic policy effects, 
strength of ECB’s policy impact in each country as compared with aggregate euro area 
reaction, and differences in transmission between floating and fixed exchange rate 
regime countries. In order to study this, I estimate a VAR models for chosen CEE 
countries which have not adopted the common currency yet. Later, I also look for the 
determinants of the achieved results in countries’ trade and financial markets 
characteristics.  
Studying the effects of monetary shocks has important implications. First, the 
effects of euro area ECB policy shocks on CEE economies provide information to the 
countries’ central banks. While making decisions on domestic monetary policy stance, 
central banks have to take into consideration both global and domestic monetary 
conditions. Especially, cross-border spill-overs of monetary policies are often of 
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considerable importance, complicating monetary policy decision-making and increasing 
volatility of real economy. It is therefore crucial to be aware of the impact that foreign 
monetary policy changes extend on the domestic economy and policy. 
By studying countries of both floating and flexible exchange rate regimes, I am also 
able to bring new evidence on a theory of monetary autonomy. The impossible trinity 
theorem states that monetary autonomy can supposedly be only achieved when country 
resigns from controlling its exchange rate. However, there also exist studies implying 
that, outside few largest economies, countries do not have much monetary freedom 
regardless of exchange rate regime (see, for instance, Frankel et al. (2004)). I want to 
re-examine that problem. 
What’s more, the extent to which CEE countries are affected by euro area monetary 
policy shocks is important for future euro adoptions. The more a country is affected by 
ECB’s monetary policy decisions now, before euro adoption and the stronger that effect 
is as compared to domestic monetary policy influence, the lower should be a cost of 
giving up its own monetary policy when it joins the monetary union. What’s more, 
dissimilar reactions of output and inflation to the common monetary policy make the 
central bank the cause of asymmetric shocks and thus, the monetary policy works 
against instead of in favour of the existence of monetary union. Such situation would 
nullify the benefit of forming monetary union in the form of elimination of domestic 
monetary policies as sources of country idiosyncratic shocks. 
This analysis is especially interesting in the light of recent euro adoption in Latvia 
(January 2014) and in Lithuania (January 2015) as well as discussions on the subject in 
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania11. Even though the outbreak of euro 
area crisis halted the prospects of prompt euro adoption, the talks on the subject did not 
disappear completely and are recursively coming back in many countries.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 contains empirical model, 
data, and sample periods explanation. Section 3 reports results from empirical analysis. 
Section 4 describes the possible factors explaining some of the results achieved in 
Section 3. Section 5 concludes and provides policy implications.  
                                                   
11 From these four countries Romania is the only one possessing at present the national target for euro 
adoption, which is set on January 2019. 
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2. Empirical methodology and data 
I use VAR framework to analyse the effects of European Central Bank’s monetary 
policy shocks and euro area output and demand shocks in chosen European Union 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
2.1 Empirical model 
The assumptions as well as the model I use in this chapter are identical to the ones 
presented in Chapter 1. The basis of the identification strategy is an assumption that 
any variables of a single country from Central and Eastern Europe do not influence 
aggregate euro area variables.  
I construct structural block-exogenous VAR model of the representation (as in Kim 
and Yang (2012)): 
𝐺(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 
where: G(L) = [
𝐺11(𝐿) 0
𝐺21(𝐿) 𝐺22(𝐿)
], 𝑦𝑡 =[
𝑦1𝑡
𝑦2𝑡
],  𝑒𝑡= [
𝑒1𝑡
𝑒2𝑡
], 
G(L) is matrix polynomial in lag operator L. Vector yt constitutes of endogenous 
variables: y1t is vector of euro area variables, y2t is vector of CEE countries variables. 𝑒𝑡 
is vector of structural disturbances. G12(L) = 0 is a restriction of block-exogeneity which 
means that y1t is not affected by current as well as lagged values of y2t.  
 The reduced-form of the VAR model has the representation: 
𝑦𝑡 = B(L)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
where: B(L) = [
𝐵11(𝐿) 0
𝐵21(𝐿) 𝐵22(𝐿)
], 𝑦𝑡 =[
𝑦1𝑡
𝑦2𝑡
],  𝑢𝑡= [
𝑢1𝑡
𝑢2𝑡
] 
B(L) is matrix polynomial in lag operator L. Vector yt constitutes for endogenous 
variables: y1t is vector of euro area variables, y2t is vector of CEE countries variables. ut 
is a vector of serially uncorrelated reduced-form disturbances with a mean zero and a 
covariance matrix Σu. I use Choleksy decomposition of the reduced-form covariance 
matrix to identify structural innovations. 
Because explanatory variables differ in some equations of the VAR equation system, 
OLS estimations provide inefficient estimates. Thus, I use seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) method to estimate the reduced form block-exogenous model. 
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Thanks to such identification method, the identified euro area monetary policy 
shocks are identical for all the countries under consideration which greatly facilitates 
cross-country comparisons. It also has an advantage of saving degrees of freedom as 
compared to the full two-country model. 
 
2.2 Data description and sources 
The data used also do not change as compared to Chapter 1. First, I construct a 
block of euro area variables which we use to identify the euro area shocks. I follow 
Peersman and Smets (2001) and include in the block data for euro area aggregate 
output, inflation, money market short term interest rate and real effective exchange 
rate. I also add one more variable to the system – economic sentiment survey data – in 
order to control for market sentiments. Therefore, I have a five-variable euro area block 
with the ordering being: output, inflation, economic sentiment indicator, short term 
interest rate and real effective exchange rate to identify the euro area structural 
monetary policy shocks.  
In the next step, I construct very similar block for each CEE country. The block for 
each CEE consists of domestic output, inflation, money market short term interest rate 
and exchange rate to euro.  
In each VAR specification I also include additional variables exogenous to both euro 
area and domestic blocks: world commodity price index and US short-term nominal 
interest rate in order to control for changes in world demand and inflation. Introducing 
federal funds rate as exogenous variables has one more important implication – it helps 
to control for changes in US monetary policy, which affect both euro area and CEE 
countries, and thus allows concentrating on the transmission of pure ECB shocks.  
All the data are of monthly frequency. The indicator of output is industrial 
production index excluding construction. Inflation is measured with harmonized index 
of consumer prices (HICP), all-items index. Interest rate used in case of euro area is 
average monthly observations of EONIA. For CEE countries I use monthly averages of 
day-to-day money market interest rates provided by Eurostat. The real effective 
exchange rate of euro area is based on consumer price indices of 42 trading partners as 
deflator. The exchange rate towards euro is formed as price in national currency for 1 
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euro. The economic sentiment in euro area is measured with Economic Sentiment 
Indicator, being a weighted average of the components of the confidence indicators for 
industry, services, consumers, construction, and retail trade provided by European 
Commission DG ECFIN. The data for euro area are taken from ECB databases, while 
the data for CEE countries are taken from Eurostat. Only data on industrial production 
in Czech Republic come from IMF IFS database. For world variables, I use All 
Commodity Price Index including both fuel and non-fuel price indices from IMF and US 
federal funds effective rate taken from Datastream.  
All the data are seasonally adjusted, in their logarithms (except for interest rates) 
and in levels. Therefore, I allow for implicit co-integration relationships in the data. 
However, as Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) state, estimates of the parameters are still 
consistent. 
I estimate all VAR models with 4 lags. The value was chosen based on Akaike 
statistic run for the euro area block specification. Admittedly, the theory points at 
longer lag order, as central banks are supposed to take into consideration data from the 
period longer than only last four months. However, some of the sample periods are quite 
short and there is a large number of coefficients to be estimated in each equation, so 
with the choice of longer lag order I would run out of degrees of freedom fast.  
 
2.3 Sample periods 
Sample period varies for each country and its length depends on the starting day 
for the latest exchange rate regime. In many CEE countries some changes in the 
exchange rate regimes took place after system transformation in the beginning of 1990s, 
as many of the countries were using exchange rate as means for stabilization of internal 
economic situation and were looking for regime best suited to their needs and economic 
conditions. 
Generally, it is possible to observe two patterns of exchange rate regime setting and 
its changes in Central and Eastern Europe. For the first group of countries that operate 
now under floating exchange rate regime (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania), 
the first choice of the regime after transition was usually some type of a hard peg. Its 
main role was to provide a nominal anchor for inflation stabilization and thus 
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Table 2-1. The exchange rate regimes in Central and Eastern European countries from 1990s and 
starting point for estimation periods. 
Country Dates Regime Sample 
period 
Bulgaria Feb 1991-Jul 1997  
July 1997  
Floating 
Currency board - first to DM, then to 
euro  
From Jan 
2000 (due 
to data 
availability) 
Czech 
Republic 
May 1993-Feb 1996 
Feb 1996-May 1997 
 
From May 1997 
Hard peg  
Peg with fluctuation margins +/- 7% 
(basket DM 65%, USD 35%) 
Managed float and inflation targeting 
(from Dec 1997) 
From July 
199712 
Hungary Until Jun 2001 
 
Jun 2001-Feb 2008 
 
 
From Feb 2008   
Narrow band peg (ecu/euro 70%; only 
euro from January 2002) 
Flexible peg to euro with wide 
fluctuation band and inflation 
targeting 
Managed/free float and inflation 
targeting 
From Jun 
200113 
Latvia Feb 1994-Dec 2004  
From Jan 2005  
Peg to SDR  
Peg to euro with +/- 1% bands 
From Jan 
2005 
Lithuania Apr 1994-Feb 2002  
From Feb 2002   
Fixed peg to USD 
Currency board towards euro 
From Feb 
2002 
Poland Until May 1995 
 
May 1995-Apr 2000 
 
From Apr 2000    
Fixed exchange rate: crawling basket 
peg with decreasing crawl 
Crawling peg with widening corridor 
(basket: USD 45%, DM 35%) 
Free float and inflation targeting 
From Apr 
2000 
Romania From January 
2002 
Managed float and inflation targeting From Jan 
2002 
                                                   
12 In May 1997 a currency crisis occurred in Czech Republic, being one of most important reasons for 
implementation of floating regime. Due to the crisis the interest rates grew to unusually high levels 
with the effects still visible in June 1997. Therefore, I exclude these two months from our sample 
period. 
13 I argue that the change to managed float regime in February 2008 does not constitute a break due 
to the fact that already from June 2001 Hungary pursued inflation targeting, and its peg to euro was 
very flexible. 
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stabilization of the economy. Then, the countries gradually eased exchange rate controls, 
achieving managed float or free float regime. The second group of countries (Bulgaria, 
Latvia, and Lithuania) operates now under fixed exchange rate regime. In case of Baltic 
countries, that was the choice made soon after gaining independence and only the base 
currency changed later. In Bulgaria, the government first opted for floating exchange 
rate regime which was then replaced with a currency board. Table 2-1 presents more 
detailed history of exchange rate regimes in CEE together with the starting days of the 
estimation samples for each country.  
 
3. Empirical results 
This section presents results of the empirical study. First, the responses of countries’ 
output, inflation, and interest rate to euro area and domestic monetary policy shocks 
are presented. I also analyse the relative importance of both of the shocks based on 
variance-covariance decomposition analysis. Next, I compare each country responses to 
ECB shocks with the aggregate euro area responses to the shock. Finally, I check 
whether exchange rate regime has any influence on the magnitude and speed of 
reaction to the euro area monetary policy shocks. 
All of the studied impulse-response functions present reactions up to 36th month 
after the shock. 
 
3.1 Reactions of euro area variables to monetary policy shocks 
Before studying effects of euro area monetary policy shocks on CEE economies, I 
present the reactions of euro area aggregate variables to common monetary policy shock. 
As Figure 2-1 shows, impulse response functions in most cases follow expectations and 
results from the previous research on the effects of euro area monetary policy shocks 
(e.g. Peersman and Smets (2001), Peersman (2004)). The output starts falling with few 
months lag, with the negative impact deepening for the next year, then recovering 
slowly and almost reaching zero at the end of considered period of 36 months. It also 
takes inflation about 2-3 months to react, after which it falls with the effect staying 
persistent. The fall in economic sentiment after interest rate increase is also observes 
but it recovers quicker and becomes positive after around 25 months. Only for the 
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exchange rate the results are not consistent with the previous research and 
expectations that after the positive interest rate shock the appreciation of a currency 
takes place. In this case, however, a small appreciation at the impact takes place but 
soon after that the index starts falling, and the depreciation of the currency occurs.  
Figure 2-1. Responses of euro area aggregate variables to euro area monetary policy shock 
 
Note: Solid lines: impulse response functions; dotted lines: bootstrapped 90% confidence bands 
 
3.2 Euro area monetary policy shock vs. domestic monetary policy shocks 
Next, I report the impulse response functions of CEE countries variables to the 
EONIA shock identified with the block-exogenous model. Blue lines at Figure 2-2 
present impulse response functions of CEE countries’ output, inflation, and interest rate 
after euro area monetary policy shocks. Because the character of exchange rate regime 
can potentially have big influence on the monetary policy transmission, while reporting 
the results I take into consideration whether country has fixed or floating exchange rate 
regime. I compare the countries within and between the groups. 
Analysing the results for the seven Central and Eastern European countries, while 
taking into consideration their exchange rate regime, high similarity of impulse 
responses for the countries with fixed exchange rate regime is clearly visible. The group 
of countries with floating exchange rate is more diversified. For all the countries, from 
both groups, the most similar is the reaction of the output. In all cases the output starts 
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falling few months after the shock and the reaction stays negative for most of or the 
whole period under consideration.  
This result is consistent with the expectations based on economic theory. The 
positive shock of the interest rate in euro area, that is the monetary contraction, should 
result in economic slowdown in the monetary union countries. Due to deep economic ties 
and high dependency of CEE countries on the Western Europe, it is plausible that the 
slowdown in the latter group transmits to the former one. In other words, the income 
absorption effect might work in here. The income decrease in one area after monetary 
policy contraction causes lower import demand and thus results in lower output in 
countries exporting to that area. This explanation seems plausible because of large 
share of CEE countries’ exports going to the euro area. The theory provides also another 
possible scenario – the expenditure-switching effect. It says that increase in the interest 
rate causes exchange rate appreciation that worsens area’s trade balance on the one 
hand and improves trade balance of the abroad on the other, contributing to its output 
growth. However, that effect apparently does not hold any importance in the analysed 
countries. 
 
Figure 2-2. Responses of CEE countries’ output, inflation and interest rate to euro area and domestic 
monetary policy shocks 
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Figure 2-2 (continued) 
 
Note: solid lines: impulse response functions (blue – reaction to euro area monetary policy shock; red – 
reaction to domestic monetary policy shock); dotted lines: bootstrapped 90% confidence bands 
 
The output decrease in CEE countries can also have its sources in the monetary 
contraction in CEE countries, provided that domestic central banks follow ECB’s 
monetary policy. As described below, this seems to be the case in CEE countries and 
therefore can serve as additional explanation for the domestic output fall after euro area 
monetary contraction. 
While the output responses are largely uniform across the countries, there are 
bigger differences in the responses of inflation. Only in case of Hungary, Latvia, Poland, 
and Romania the reaction stays negative for the whole period of 36 months. In the 
remaining countries, after few months of declining inflation rate, it starts rising or goes 
back to the starting point and does not change anymore. 
One of the reasons for falling prices in CEE countries after euro area monetary 
contraction can be import of deflationary pressure from euro area. After interest rate 
increase, prices in euro area fall which also depresses import prices for CEE countries. 
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That has already direct impact on the overall price level in the countries. That 
mechanism seems plausible because of large share of CEE countries’ imports coming 
from euro area. However, it does not explain short-run inflation decreases in some CEE 
countries (mainly Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Czech Republic).  
The fall in domestic inflation, similarly to output, can also take place if the foreign 
monetary contraction causes increase in domestic interest rates which also happens in 
CEE countries’ case. As interest rates usually react immediately to the euro area 
monetary shock it might be interpreted as a reason for the initial fall in inflation. 
In all countries with fixed exchange rate as well as in Hungary and Romania it is 
possible to observe quick rise in the interest rate after the ECB monetary policy shock 
with most of the effect disappearing in just few months. Only in Czech Republic interest 
rate grows slower and the effect fades out slowly. Poland stands out even more with the 
positive effect on the interest rate not fading out for the whole considered period. That 
result may seem a bit surprising as according to the impossible trinity theorem it is 
rather expected that more significant and larger rise of interest rate occurs in countries 
with fixed exchange rate and only small and/or insignificant increase takes place in 
floaters. Therefore, these results confirm the previous research conclusions that even 
the countries with floating exchange rate regime are not characterized with much 
monetary autonomy.  
The analysis up till now shows that euro area monetary policy shocks have high 
influence on the domestic variables of CEE countries. Thus, the question arises how this 
influence compares with the effects of domestic monetary policy. In order to check this, I 
go back to Figure 2-2 which contains responses to not only EONIA shocks (blue lines) 
but also responses to domestic interest rate shocks (red lines). In order to carry out 
comparisons of the two effects, both shocks are normalized so that they have equal 
magnitude of one.  
The analysis of the impulse-response functions with their confidence bands implies 
that there are many significant differences between effects of EONIA and domestic 
interest rate shocks. This is especially the case for the output variable which usually 
falls deeper after euro area monetary policy shock. The exceptions would be Hungary 
where the responses to both shocks are very similar as well as Poland and Romania 
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where domestic policy effects are stronger. Inflation is falling more after EONIA shock 
in Bulgaria, Latvia, and Hungary but differences are usually not statistically significant. 
One of the reasons lies in the very wide confidence bands on most of inflation responses. 
When it comes to the interest rate, the initial response is naturally higher after 
domestic interest rate shocks but EONIA shocks have often more persistent effects. 
However, especially in Poland and Romania, but also in Hungary and Czech Republic to 
some extent, we observe considerably stronger effects of domestic shocks. 
These results imply that euro area monetary policy shocks not only have an 
important influence on CEE countries’ macroeconomic variables but also that in many 
cases this influence seems to be stronger than influence of domestic interest rate 
changes. This shows the difficulty of situation the central banks of floating exchange 
rate regime countries face when it comes to carrying out their monetary policy and 
deciding on their policy stance and how much both floating and fixed exchange rate 
economies are affected by euro area monetary policy. 
 
3.3 Variance-covariance decomposition 
After looking at impulse response functions which show the direction of responses 
to the shocks, I study again the relative strength of euro area and domestic interest rate 
changes using variance-covariance decompositions of the domestic variables due to 
mentioned shocks. Table 2-2 shows the percentage of the variance in each domestic 
variable explained by EONIA shocks as compared to domestic interest rate shocks 12, 
24, 36 months after the shock as well as the maximum values reached within 36-month 
period. 
For most of the countries, EONIA is responsible for much larger part of output 
variance than domestic interest rate. Only for Poland and Romania the values are close 
to each other. What’s more, the influence of EONIA is usually increasing with the time, 
reaching maximum in the third year after the shock, while domestic interest rate’s 
impact is usually highest in the first year after the shock and then the impact gradually 
diminishes. Only in case of Poland the maximum impact of domestic influence is 
reached much later – in 25th month. 
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Table 2-2. Variance-covariance decompositions of CEE countries’ output, inflation and interest rate due to euro area and domestic monetary policy shocks 
Output Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania 
shocks 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
EONI
A 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
12 8.20 0.25 4.11 1.25 6.50 1.42 4.72 5.71 2.40 1.39 6.07 5.09 4.72 5.71 
24 11.75 0.14 9.38 1.18 9.06 1.34 4.62 4.90 4.01 1.38 13.03 9.24 4.62 4.90 
36 12.56 0.11 9.75 1.12 9.29 1.28 4.75 4.69 4.79 1.37 12.99 9.07 4.75 4.69 
max 12.56 0.34 9.78 1.27 9.29 1.66 5.32 7.61 4.79 1.49 13.30 9.25 5.32 7.61 
Note: percentage of variables’ variance explained by the shocks 12, 24 and 36 months after the shock as well as the maximum value reached within 36 months 
period.  
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Table 2-2 (continued) 
Inflati
on 
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania 
shocks 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
12 1.98 19.22 3.17 1.22 8.40 1.46 2.68 0.85 3.57 3.58 3.18 0.45 3.42 1.67 
24 1.53 16.83 2.72 0.92 10.49 1.41 4.63 0.30 4.05 3.13 2.31 4.06 8.68 2.49 
36 1.45 15.83 2.44 0.75 10.41 1.23 6.81 0.16 5.14 2.98 3.72 7.22 11.79 2.31 
max 3.07 19.41 3.81 1.23 10.60 1.80 6.81 1.35 5.14 3.74 8.09 7.22 11.79 2.49 
 
Interest 
rate 
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania 
shocks 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
Euro 
area 
domes
tic 
12 8.05 58.18 14.78 21.45 6.41 49.99 5.73 65.85 41.16 40.09 11.64 35.44 12.57 36.99 
24 7.82 52.38 13.82 12.70 6.44 46.01 5.54 60.89 42.85 34.28 8.43 16.53 12.54 26.79 
36 7.49 50.11 12.95 11.82 6.34 45.35 5.42 57.95 41.37 32.04 8.79 14.43 11.72 24.67 
max 8.22 95.20 15.12 91.26 8.12 90.52 5.83 96.01 43.09 91.96 12.98 84.23 12.89 88.34 
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The situation in case of inflation is more diverse. While only for Bulgaria and 
Poland we observe higher influence of domestic interest rate from the second year after 
the shock, the exact differences between EONIA and domestic rate shocks are divergent 
across countries. In Czech Republic and Lithuania, the EONIA rate influence is only 
slightly higher. Hungary and Latvia (to some extent), and Romania show much higher 
percentage of inflation variance explained by EONIA in comparison to domestic interest 
rate. 
The maximum values for domestic interest rate shocks are naturally much higher 
in case of its own shock than EONIA one. The results for 12th, 24th and 36th month after 
the shock imply that in Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia it is domestic interest rate shocks 
that influence most of interest rate variance. The EONIA shocks have only small, 
additional impact. Also in Poland and Romania domestic interest rate impact is higher 
but the difference is not as decisive as in aforementioned countries. In Lithuania 
EONIA’s impact is higher. However, in here both euro area and domestic interest rate 
play very important role, explaining together over 70% of domestic interest rate 
variance. Only in case of Czech Republic in the longer run EONIA’s shocks start 
explaining slightly higher variance than domestic interest rate shocks.  
Based on the results of the variance covariance decomposition analysis, I can 
confirm that euro area monetary policy shocks have important influence on domestic 
variables and that this influence is often higher than the one of domestic interest rates. 
Comparison of the results from IRFs and variance-covariance analyses brings also some 
interesting observations regarding magnitude of changes and fluctuations of variables. 
While IRFs analysis points at EONIA shocks as a reason for higher and more persistent 
domestic interest rate increases in fixed exchange rate countries, the variation of 
interest rates still depends more on its own shocks (in exception for Lithuania). The 
output in floating exchange countries often falls more due to domestic monetary policy 
shocks but the fluctuations in output depend more on euro area monetary policy 
changes (in exception of Romania). Therefore, it is important to clearly distinguish 
between variables’ changes and variables’ fluctuations while taking about influence of 
the shocks on the economy. 
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3.4 Euro area aggregate response vs. individual country responses 
For the future success of monetary union not only the strength of country reaction to 
the common shocks but also the similarity of reaction as compared to the average is 
important. The more effects of common monetary policy are similar across countries, 
the easiest it is for the central bank to make monetary policy decisions. Looking another 
way around, the similarity of reactions to the average means that common monetary 
policy should have effects close to the ones aimed by ECB while making policy decisions.  
 
Figure 2-3. Responses to euro area monetary policy shock: aggregate euro area response vs. individual 
CEE country response. 
 
Note: Impulse response functions after euro area monetary policy shocks; red line: aggregate euro area 
response with the shaded area of 90% confidence bands; blue marked lines: each CEE country 
responses 
 
Figure 2-3 plots the responses of each CEE country output, inflation, and interest 
rate against aggregate euro area responses and their confidence area. The first 
observation I make is the fact that output responses across the countries are most 
similar to the aggregate euro area response. Only in case of Bulgaria and Romania the 
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output response is outside the significance area of aggregate response for a longer 
period of time. Especially Bulgarian output falls more persistently and significantly 
more deeply than in euro area. 
The responses of inflation are the most diverse ones. While in Romania, Hungary, 
and Poland the response is quite similar to the aggregate one and stays within euro 
area confidence bands for most of the time, other countries show significant deviations. 
Latvia does not seem to have a severe problem as the inflation fall stays similar to the 
euro area one for around year and a half, and after that time appears to be deeper. The 
more severe situation can be observed in case of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and 
Lithuania. In these countries after initial, few-months-long fall, inflation goes back to 
zero or even starts rising in the latter two countries. It is clearly visible that these 
reactions differ significantly from the aggregate euro area one. 
The results on rather similar reactions of output and more divergent responses of 
inflation across the countries follow the findings of Peersman (2004). In his study for the 
original euro area countries he also finds that output responses are relatively uniform 
across the countries, while price reactions tend to differ more. 
In this paper, I look also at the responses of interest rates to the common monetary 
policy shock. While comparing them with EONIA increase after its own shock, it is 
clearly visible that in most of the countries interest rates increase even more than 
EONIA. What’s more, in many cases the reactions are outside euro area’s 90% 
confidence band. It shows that effects of euro area monetary policy shocks have even 
stronger effects on the CEE countries interest rates than on the euro area ones. 
 
3.5 Fixed vs. floating exchange rate regime 
In order to have a better outlook on the scale of differences in foreign monetary 
shocks transmission between flexible and fixed exchange rate regime countries, I study 
also the average responses for each group. Figure 2-4 presents average impulse 
response functions to EONIA shocks for the two groups. On the whole, results show 
similar patterns for both the fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. There is mainly 
the difference in the magnitude of the reactions. The output falls deeper for fixed 
exchange rate regimes. Inflation fall is similar for both groups. It is deeper in fixed 
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exchange rate countries in the first months after the shock as well as in the longer run. 
Between 7th and 28th month after the shock inflation decreases more in countries with 
floating exchange rate regime. Interest rate shows higher increase for fixed exchange 
rate regimes but the reaction is slightly more persistent in the floating countries.  
 
Figure 2-4. Average responses to euro area monetary policy shocks for fixed and floating exchange rate 
groups of countries 
 
Note: Average impulse response functions; blue line: fixed exchange rate regime countries, red line: 
floating exchange rate regime countries 
 
The results follow the expectations that transmission of foreign monetary policy 
shocks is stronger in fixed exchange regime countries though one might have expected 
higher differences. However, with the exchange rate adjusting freely after foreign 
shocks, the shocks’ effects on the economy should be not only weaker but also slower. In 
this case, however, there is no evidence on the reactions in floating countries being more 
sluggish, as was also shown for instance by Canova (2005) for Latin America countries. 
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4. Determinants of monetary policy shocks’ effects 
In Section 3 I describe the effects of euro area monetary policy shocks in seven CEE 
countries basing on the VAR framework. The only country characteristics I take into 
consideration as potential reason for divergent results across countries is exchange rate 
regime. In this Section, I look for the determinants of euro monetary policy shocks 
effects’ taking into consideration three main categories of country characteristics: 
country’s overall openness, and country’s relations to euro area, country’s financial 
markets depth. Table 1-3 in Chapter 1 presents variables for each category together 
with their definitions and sources. The data are sample periods averages of annual data 
for each country.  
Since my sample contains only seven countries, I am unable to carry out 
econometric analysis studying statistical significance of beta coefficients. Thus, I turn to 
the descriptive study of the potential determinants. In order to look for potential 
determinants, I transform previously presented results to the numerical values and 
present them along with the potential determinant variables in Tables 2-3a and 2-3b. 
First columns contain cumulative responses of each country variables to euro area 
monetary policy shocks in 6th period after the shock14 as well as average variance of the 
variables explained with EONIA shocks15 . Following ones present the considered 
country characteristics. 
Collation of the VAR results with the CEE characteristics’ variables implies first 
that both magnitude of response and variables’ variations depend on similar CEE 
characteristics.  
The magnitude of output response shows rather strong relation with share of 
country’s portfolio flows with euro area in total flows. Higher portfolio flows, and 
especially higher share of euro area portfolio assets, are related with output react less 
(fall less) after euro area contradictory monetary policy shocks. Higher share of euro 
area portfolio assets seems also to diminish the variability of output occurring due to 
euro area monetary policy shocks.  
                                                   
14 Preliminary analysis reveals that chosen characteristics explain better the responses in the 
short-run. The long-run effects of the euro area monetary policy shocks seem not to depend strongly on 
any of chosen characteristics. 
15 While the choice of average variations is arbitrary, the main observations do not change 
considerably even if variations from any other period are used. 
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Table 2-3a. Cumulative responses to euro area monetary policy shocks, average variance of domestic variables due to the shocks, together with variables 
describing CEE countries financial market development. 
 Cumulative responses Variance decomposition Financial market characteristics 
 
Output 
Infla- 
tion 
Interest 
rate 
Output 
Infla- 
tion 
Interest 
rate 
Stock market 
capitalizatio
n 
Corporatio
n securities 
MFI 
credit 
Claims 
of euro 
area 
MFIs 
Foreign 
claims 
Bulg. -0.548 -0.355 58.759 8.761 1.714 7.138 15.267 2.264 49.236 15.371 14.086 
Czech 
Rep. 
-0.432 -0.207 33.020 6.353 2.752 12.725 23.106 24.186 43.708 6.400 15.301 
Hung. -0.022 -0.379 24.833 7.065 9.015 6.386 23.313 19.600 54.950 18.618 8.488 
Latvia -0.561 -0.308 54.628 11.200 4.196 4.973 8.489 1.692 65.208 11.400 23.750 
Lith. -0.084 -0.167 78.054 3.127 3.844 37.780 18.494 1.983 46.300 12.700 12.204 
Poland -0.347 -0.210 29.047 8.768 3.679 9.445 28.227 8.431 40.277 8.650 5.938 
Rom. 0.404 -0.173 46.957 4.501 6.302 11.869 11.318 1.100 35.000 26.657 3.106 
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Table 2-3b. Variables describing CEE countries relations with euro area and overall openness. 
 Relations with euro area Openness 
 
Export Import 
Inward 
FDI 
Outwar
d FDI 
Portfo- 
lio liab. 
Portfo- 
lio 
assets 
Trade FDI 
Portfo- 
lio 
Trade 
openne
ss 
Kaopen 
Bulg. 48.957 44.271 68.771 46.562 66.683 47.267 46.614 57.666 56.975 121.103 0.638 
Czech 
Rep. 
67.807 63.114 82.007 67.343 50.750 65.967 65.461 74.675 58.358 136.853 1.945 
Hung. 60.985 54.885 68.531 35.600 64.258 57.933 57.935 52.065 61.096 146.761 2.281 
Latvia 33.623 42.154 39.631 20.669 74.464 21.283 37.888 30.150 47.873 99.501 2.358 
Lith. 40.033 39.808 38.058 49.000 73.891 66.456 39.921 43.529 70.173 120.464 2.175 
Poland 57.071 57.000 74.293 42.021 50.492 38.008 57.036 58.157 44.250 74.453 -0.141 
Rom. 55.633 52.158 79.373 14.456 67.182 72.936 53.896 46.914 70.059 74.783 1.832 
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The scale of the fall in output after euro area monetary policy shocks seems also to 
depend on some banking sector characteristics. Higher claims of euro area MFIs on 
domestic MFIs seem to work as a buffer protecting from deeper output falls. On the 
other hand, the more foreign claims the domestic depository institutions possess, the 
higher is the fall in output after euro area interest rate increase. Additionally, the 
variability of output seems to be higher when country has higher ratio of MFI credit to 
GDP. 
When it comes to the magnitude of inflation fall after euro area monetary 
contraction, the data imply that ratio of MFI credit may hold a meaning. Higher ratio of 
MFI credit in GDP means inflation falling more after the shocks. Inflation rate 
fluctuations, on the other hand, seem to be affected more by euro area monetary policy 
shocks when claims of euro area MFIs on domestic MFIs are higher.  
The cumulative effect on interest rates seems to be higher when country has lower 
share of corporation securities in GDP, lower trade with euro area, and lower inward 
FDI from euro area. What’s more, higher share of portfolio liabilities connected to euro 
area seems to boost the reaction of domestic interest rates after euro area interest rate 
increase. 
The interest rate fluctuations does not seem to be highly influenced by any of the 
presented characteristics but there seems to be some connection with the share of 
portfolio flows with euro area.  
Summing up, reactions of domestic variables to euro area monetary policy shocks 
seem to depend mainly on portfolio relations with euro area as well as on some banking 
sector characteristics. These two channels seem to be also the most natural way in 
which foreign interest rate changes may affect domestic economies. Banking sector is 
usually the main channel transmitting monetary policy decisions to the real economy. 
What’s more, banks in CEE countries have strong financial connections with euro area 
banks, making them prone to receive strong influence after ECB policy changes that 
affect euro area banking system. My results also partly confirm that banking sector 
plays more important role in affecting economic situation in CEE countries than stock 
or corporation securities markets. Portfolio investment, on the other hand, out of the 
different kinds of capital, is the one most and fastest affected by the interest rate 
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changes. Thus, due to high share of CEE countries’ capital flows occurring with euro 
area, it can account for the important determinants of the euro area monetary policy 
effects in these countries.  
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
In this paper I employ VAR methodology in order to study empirically the 
dependence of CEE economies on changes in euro area monetary policy. The results 
point at strong influence of euro area money market interest rate shocks on the 
economies under consideration which is also often higher and more prolonged than 
domestic interest rate shocks’ influence. What’s more, while output responses across the 
countries are quite similar to the aggregate euro area reaction, in case of inflation 
higher divergences are observed.  
The results of the analysis bring few important conclusions and implications. First, 
there is the importance of the exchange rate regime in keeping monetary autonomy. 
Strong interest rate reactions even in the countries with floating exchange rate regimes 
confirm the results of previous research stating that even floaters do not have much 
monetary autonomy. Moreover, the reactions of macroeconomic variables after ECB’s 
monetary policy shock show very similar patterns for both fixed and floating exchange 
rate countries. These results confirm low importance of exchange rate regime choice in 
foreign shock transmission and therefore the need to use other criteria for the choice of 
exchange rate regime. 
The results I achieve imply that central banks of floating exchange rate regime 
Central and Eastern European countries should take into consideration European 
Central Bank’s monetary policy while deciding their own policy stance. Also in fixed 
exchange rate countries, where monetary policy rule is more automatic, it is important 
to estimate detailed influence of changes in monetary conditions in euro area on the 
country economy. In all the countries euro area variables seem to be useful indicators in 
forecasting future changes of domestic policy goals as well as macroeconomic conditions 
- the information that central banks should not ignore. Additionally, in floating 
countries this is to avoid the situation when the economy is depressed or stimulated too 
much through simultaneous ECB’s and national central bank’s policy changes.  
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Our analysis allows also drawing some implications regarding the future euro 
adoptions in Central and Eastern European countries. Most of them are common for 
both floating and fixed exchange rate countries. Quite high, on average, influence of 
euro area monetary policy shocks, often higher than influence of domestic shocks as well 
as dependence of domestic interest rate on changes in EONIA can serve as argument for 
euro adoption in most CEE countries.  
On the other hand, however, divergent inflation responses and large standard 
deviations for inflation reactions can pose potential problems after euro adoption. The 
reason is the fact that ECB’s main objective lies in inflation and not output stabilization. 
Therefore, uncertain and divergent changes in inflation rate can make implementation 
of the common monetary policy extremely difficult, if not impossible. As de Grauwe 
(2009) points out, different economic conditions in monetary union countries can bring 
the situation where ECB has no reason for interest rate changes because the average 
rate of inflation in euro area will always be between actual inflation rates in individual 
countries. What’s more, as Guiso et al. (1999) state, the differences in the size and the 
speed of adjustment to the shocks, meaning uneven distribution of the adjustment costs, 
might also lead to the political tensions across the countries. 
This situation, however, might also be more harmful to CEE countries than ECB 
policy making process. ECB might not change its policy even after the countries adopt 
euro due to relatively small size of these economies. 16  That would mean ECB’s 
monetary policy decisions often not fitting economic situation in the countries, leading 
to further destabilization of the economy. Especially, divergent inflation rates together 
with common nominal interest rate lead to differences in real interest rates across 
countries. Too high real rates might excessively depress the economy, while too low 
might lead to unsustainable booms at asset markets. Recent years have already given 
us examples on these cases, proving the danger to be more than just theoretical 
deliberation. Therefore, there exists a need for detailed country-specific study on risks 
of euro adoption connected to the role of real interest rate in the economy. 
There exist also some implications connected to euro adoption decision depending on 
                                                   
16 ECB makes policy decisions based on aggregate euro area data computed as weighted averages of 
the data on euro area individual member states. Therefore, in case of small country adopting euro the 
weighted average of aggregate euro area data do not change considerably. 
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country’s exchange rate regime. While in case of fixed exchange rate regime the shock 
transmission after euro adoption might not change significantly, the loss of floating 
exchange rate regime might constitute for important structural break in transmission 
mechanism. That means the need for further analysis of the role of floating exchange 
rate and the effects of euro adoptions in these countries, which however exceeds the 
scope of this chapter.  
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Chapter 3.                                   
Domestic monetary policy in Central and Eastern 
European countries. Foreign exchange market situation 
and the role in euro area shock transmission. 
 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 I present the influence of euro area output and 
inflation, and monetary policy shocks on economic variables in Central and Eastern 
European countries. This analysis provides evidence on the scale of dependence of 
macroeconomic and monetary situation in CEE countries on the changes in euro area 
output, inflation, and monetary policy, on the incidence of disturbances as well as on the 
speed of adjustment to the disturbances; that is on the issues which determine the 
magnitude of costs of forming monetary union. 
In this chapter, I move to study some of the costs and benefits of euro adoption in 
CEE countries, connected to the loss of independent monetary policy. I concentrate on 
the two main monetary policy instruments: interest rate changes, i.e. central bank 
responses after changes in euro area economic situation or monetary policy, as well as 
automatic mechanism of exchange rate changes.  
When it comes to exchange rate, many previous studies name it as important 
channel of international shock transmission. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), for 
instance,  prove that transmission of US monetary policy shocks to global equity 
markets occurs largely through the short-term interest rates and the exchange rate. 
Artis and Ehrmann (2006), on the other hand, show that exchange rate plays a role in 
transmission of foreign monetary policy shocks to the real economy. 
The OCA theory gives exchange rate the role of the shock absorber and stabilization 
mechanism. Therefore, Mundell (1961) states resignation from independent monetary 
policy and exchange rate as instruments of adjustment as the main cost of forming 
monetary union. However, there exists also empirical evidence on exchange rate 
contributing to the economic fluctuations (e.g. Kontolemis and Samiei (2000) for UK). 
What’s more, OCA names elimination of the exchange rate variability as one of the main 
benefits of joining monetary union. Therefore, I find it important to determine which of 
the views holds in case of the chosen CEE countries and study the role of exchange rate 
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as shock absorber in their case. Additionally, I look for the answer to the question on 
how the economy would behave after foreign shocks if exchange rate did not react to the 
shocks. Through this analysis, I provide evidence on the scale of costs of giving up own 
exchange rate in these countries. 
The study on the exchange rate role in foreign shock transmission as well as on the 
exchange rate variability in CEE countries is also interesting in the view of identified in 
many countries fear of floating (e.g. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) for range of countries 
around the world; Windberger et.al (2012) for CEE countries) and managed float 
exchange rate regimes in three CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania). 
These issues raise questions on the scale of authorities’ interventions on foreign 
exchange market as well as the strength of exchange rate variations and their sources. 
Finding answers to these problems will bring additional information for and on 
domestic monetary policies as well as the evidence on the potential benefits of euro 
adoption. 
The exchange rate can act as automatic instrument of adjustment after foreign 
shocks. However, monetary authorities can also react to the foreign shocks directly, 
through changes in interest rates. Losing that instrument is also considered an 
important cost of joining monetary union. At the same time, however, individual 
monetary policy can be also treated as potential source of asymmetrical shocks. 
Similarly to the case of exchange rate, I want to provide an empirical evidence on that 
ambiguity in case of chosen CEE countries. In order to do that, I check whether central 
bank reactions neutralize foreign shocks’ impact or rather act as the additional source of 
the shocks and how the reaction of domestic variables to the shocks changes in the case 
when there is no central bank reaction to the shocks. With this, I hope to provide an 
evidence on the real magnitude of the costs of monetary union connected to abandoning 
the independent monetary policy. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents empirical model 
used for the analysis as well as data and country sample. Section 3 studies exchange 
rate market situation – volatility and authorities’ interventions in each country. Section 
4 contains analysis of the role of domestic monetary policy in euro area shock 
transmission. Section 5 concludes and provides policy implications. 
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2. Empirical methodology and data 
This section presents empirical methodology used for the analysis as well as the 
data. The analysis is based on the VAR framework. 
 
2.1 Empirical model 
As in previous chapters, an empirical methodology is based on the assumption that 
euro area variables are not influenced by any variables of a single country from Central 
and Eastern Europe. Additionally, I want to limit a number of estimated coefficients in 
the model. For that purposes, in this chapter I decide on the two-step VAR framework. 
First, I estimate euro area output, inflation, and monetary policy shocks based on 
aggregate euro area variables. Then, I include the estimated euro area shocks as 
exogenous variable in each CEE country model. 
First, I construct the following structural VAR model consisting of euro area 
variables:  
G(L)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑏0 + ∈𝑡  (1) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a vector of euro area variables, 𝑏0 is a constant vector, G(L) = G0 – G1L – 
…– Gp Lp is a pth order lag polynomial of coefficient matrix Bj (j = 1, …, p) (the diagonal 
elements of B0 are equal to 1), and ∈𝑡 is a vector of serially uncorrelated structural 
disturbances with a mean zero and a covariance matrix 𝛴∊.  
The structural model above can be described by the following reduced-form VAR: 
𝑦𝑡 = B(L)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡  (2) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a vector of euro area variables, B(L) is matrix polynomial in lag operator L, 
and 𝑒𝑡  is a vector of serially uncorrelated structural disturbances with a mean zero and 
a covariance matrix Σe. I use Cholesky decomposition of the reduced-form covariance 
matrix to identify structural innovations. 
Using the structural innovations of euro area variables identified in the first step, I 
next estimate for each CEE country the reduced-form VAR model of the form: 
𝑥𝑡 = C(L)𝑥𝑡−1+ D(L)𝜀𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡  (3) 
where 𝑥𝑡 is a vector of CEE variables, 𝜀𝐸𝐴𝑡 is the euro area shock vector estimated 
with equation (2), and 𝑢𝑡  is a vector of serially uncorrelated structural disturbances 
with a mean zero and covariance matrix Σu. 
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2.2 Data and country sample 
Data sample used for estimations in this chapter does not differ significantly from 
the previous chapters. In estimation of euro area VAR model, I use aggregate euro area 
data on output, inflation, economic sentiment, interest rate, and real effective exchange 
rate. The CEE domestic variables’ vector includes each country output, inflation, 
interest rate, intervention variable, and nominal exchange rate to euro. As compared to 
the previous chapters, there is one new variable – intervention – with which I intend to 
control for authorities interference in foreign exchange market. The variable is based on 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) and is calculated as a change in reserves normalized 
by narrow money: 
INTERVENTIONt = [dRESERVESt] /NARROWt-1  (4) 
where NARROWt is the narrow money aggregate (M1) and RESERVESt means country 
foreign reserves. Using Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) words, the intervention 
variable measures “the degree to which countries use changes in reserves to neutralize 
incipient exchange-rate movements”. The change in reserves is normalized by narrow 
money aggregate in order to control for a price level change generated with the change 
in reserves. Some other studies also estimate intervention as a change in reserves but 
often normalize it with the monetary base to control for money stock changes caused by 
the intervention. That approach, however, ignores the role of banks and created by them 
wider monetary aggregates in a price level determination. As Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1998) argue, using monetary base might be justified in countries with highly regulated 
banking systems but not in most of industrialized countries at the time. Due to banking 
system development and growing role of wider monetary aggregates in the CEE 
economies, I also believe that using M1 aggregate is more justified in my case. 
All the data is of monthly frequency, in levels and expressed in logarithms (except 
for interest rates). Based on Akaike information criterion for euro area, I estimate all 
VARs with 4 lags. The number of lags is equal for all the country models in order to 
ensure as high as possible comparability across results. 
The analysis in the previous chapters encompassed seven Central and Eastern 
European countries. Because three of them operate under fixed exchange rate regime 
(Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Latvia), I exclude them from the analysis on monetary policy 
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role. Therefore, country sample in this chapter consists of four CEE countries with 
floating exchange rate regime: Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania which operate under 
managed float, and Poland with free float exchange rate regime. 
The sample periods for the countries are the same as in Chapter 2. Namely, they 
include the data on only the most recent (present) exchange rate regimes in each 
country.  
 
3. Exchange rate market situation 
Before moving to the analysis on the role of monetary policy in the transmission of 
euro area shock, I provide some insight on the exchange rate market volatility and the 
scale of foreign exchange market interventions in CEE countries. In order to carry out 
the analyisis, I reach to the previous research and calculate introduced there indices 
illustrating exchange rate variability and pressure as well as foreign exchange market 
interventions in CEE countries.  
Through studying these issues I intend to draw attention to the two aspects. The 
first one is the actual situation of the country exchange rate market. I analyse exchange 
rate variability as well as market pressure on a currency in order to illustrate country’s 
foreign exchange market conditions. 
Second, I want to provide information on the role of exchange rate in the process of 
monetary policy making in each country. Heavy intervention on foreign exchange 
market means that central banks pay special attention to the exchange rate levels. That 
issue brings implications for both the role of exchange rate in shock transmission and 
the cost of giving up monetary policy with euro adoption.  
In order to analyse the extent of market pressure extended on each country 
currency, I calculate an index of speculative pressure introduced by Eichengreen, Rose, 
and Wyplosz (1994). They use the index in order to identify speculative attacks and 
currency crises through joint analysis of changes in exchange rate, interest rates, and 
foreign reserves. The basic idea is that the rising pressure on currency deprecation is 
usually accompanied with decline in foreign reserves and increase in domestic interest 
rates. However, as changes in these three variables can also come from normal market 
conditions, and not necessarily speculative attacks, the index can be also interpreted as 
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showing overall pressure that markets extend on a currency (Gruszczynski (2011)). I 
calculate the index with the following formula: 
𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡= -%Δ𝑒𝑡 - %Δ (𝑖𝑡-𝑖𝑡
∗) + %Δ𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  (5) 
where 𝑒𝑡 – exchange rate to euro, 𝑖𝑡, 𝑖𝑡
∗ - domestic and foreign interest rates, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 – 
domestic foreign reserves. %Δ indicates the first differences of the considered variable in 
percentage points. I introduce some changes to the calculation as compared to the 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994). The sign of the index is made so that an 
interpretation is more straightforward (positive value means appreciation pressure, 
negative – depreciation pressure). The exchange rate used for calculations is nominal 
exchange rate of each CEE country domestic currency to euro, interest rates are each 
country money market rates and EONIA, respectively, and CEE countries’ reserves are 
denominated in euro. 
Next, in order to analyse the scope of exchange rate market interventions, I go back 
to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) paper and calculate introduced by them index of 
intervention showing the magnitude of shocks to the exchange rate between countries i 
and j: 
IoI = 1 - stdev(ΔExrate) /stddev(ΔPRESSURE), (6) 
where ‘stdev’ denotes the standard deviation, Δ denotes the first difference and 
PRESSUREt =ΔExrateij + INTERVENTIONit –INTERVENTIONjt  (7) 
Exrateij is the exchange rate between countries i and j (euro area and individual CEE 
country in this case), constructed such that an increase is an appreciation. PRESSUREt 
is defined by the authors as “shadow movement in exchange rate between countries i 
and j”. It adjusts changes in exchange rate for the interventions carried out by the 
authorities of the two countries. INTERVENTIONt is the presented before variable 
measuring authorities’ interference on country’s foreign exchange market. In this case, 
however, I assume that any foreign exchange market interventions take place only on 
the CEE country side, with ECB not intervening at all, and thus I make euro area 
intervention variable (INTERVENTIONit) equal zero. 
The need for studying countries’ indices of intervention lies in the fact that most of 
the countries do not publish detailed information on foreign exchange market 
interventions they carry out. Analysing such data would be the best way to assess the 
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actual scale of interventions. However, due to lack of sufficient information, I turn to the 
analysis of the index provided by the literature on the subject. 
Table 3-1 contains simple exchange rate volatility measure and calculated indices. 
Column one shows average annual standard deviation (as percentage) of monthly 
percentage changes in exchange rate to euro, column two contains the variance of Index 
of Speculative Pressure and column three presents Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) 
index of intervention for each country.  
 
Table 3-1. Exchange rate volatility, index of speculative pressure and index of intervention for floating 
exchange rate regime countries. 
 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
ISP variability 
Index of 
intervention 
Czech Republic 1.342 14.172 0.1947 
Hungary 1.525 17.929 0.1725 
Poland 2.102 20.407 0.0333 
Romania 1.541 19.713 0.5457 
Notes: exchange rate volatility – annual standard deviation (as percentage) of monthly percentage 
changes in the exchange rate to euro; ISP variability – variance of index of speculative pressure based 
on Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz (1994); Index of intervention – based on Bayoumi, Eichengreen (1998) 
exchange rate volatility and intervention measures 
 
Average annual exchange rate volatility in CEE countries is not high. It barely 
exceeds 2% per annum in case of Poland and is even lower in other considered 
countries.17 The highest level of volatility in Poland can be partly explained with lack of 
foreign exchange interventions in the country. Other countries, operating under 
managed float exchange rate regime, can be assumed to carry out interventions that 
partly stabilize exchange rate volatility. The levels of the index of intervention can also 
act as confirmation for this assumption. 
Variation of market pressure extended on the currency is also quite similar across 
the countries. Again, the volatility of the pressure is highest in case of Poland while the 
lowest in Czech Republic. In opposition to exchange rate volatility, it is not plausible to 
explain the highest pressure being extended on Polish currency only with a lower scale 
of interventions. While there might be some connection, the construction of ISP should 
largely exclude the influence of authorities’ interventions on the index through 
                                                   
17 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998), for instance, define high volatility level with annual standard 
deviation over 8% and moderate volatility with deviation between 4% and 8%. 
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controlling for change in reserves and interest rates. Therefore, there is a need to look 
for other explanations. One of the plausible reasons might be the fact that Poland 
accounts for the biggest currency market in Central Europe, with the highest number of 
transactions, possibly resulting in higher currency volatility and variability of pressure. 
Finally, going to the index of intervention, the values follow the expectations with 
the lowest level in Poland. With its free floating exchange rate regime, it is to be 
expected that practically no foreign exchange market interventions are taking place and 
the index also provides evidence on almost no interventions being carried out.18 In 
countries with managed floating exchange rate regime indices point at the occurrence of 
foreign exchange market interference. In case of Czech Republic and Hungary, there 
exists evidence of a moderate scale of interventions taking place. Index for Romania, on 
the other hand, points at even larger scale of interventions. However, even in this case 
the index of intervention is much smaller than not only the value considered by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) as heavy intervention (index value over 0.85) but also 
medium level of intervention (index value between 0.7 and 0.85). The reason for such 
difference might lie in the fact that the authors’ analysis encompasses periods of 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, i.e. the time when pegged exchange rate regimes and exchange rate 
interventions were much more widespread. For the analysis concentrated on period 
after year 2000, the lower value of the index should be probably considered as 
benchmark for defining medium and heavy levels of interventions. 
The values of index of intervention for fixed exchange rate countries confirm this 
supposition as well. The third column in Table 3-2 shows that all three countries – 
Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania – carry out heavy interventions, even according to 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) criteria. The results come most probably from the fact 
of Bulgaria and Lithuania having to intervene on the market in order to keep currency 
board regime and Latvia protecting its narrow peg of ±1% bands. 
There exists also a need to explain the average annual exchange rate volatility in 
the fixed exchange rate regime countries. In case of Bulgaria and Lithuania, i.e. 
                                                   
18 After introducing floating exchange rate regime in April 2000, Poland has not carried out any 
foreign exchange market interventions for 10 years. National Bank of Poland carried out the first 
intervention in April 2010 in order to weaken zloty. After that, starting from year 2011 few actual and 
few verbal interventions took place, carried out not only by NBP but also the Ministry of Finance or 
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (National Economy Bank - Polish only state-owned bank). 
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countries with currency board regimes, no currency volatility at all could be expected. 
However, even though very low, there is some noticeable volatility in Bulgarian lev and 
Lithuanian litas. The reason for the slight average fluctuations lies in the first years of 
the regime in Bulgaria and Lithuania when small changes of exchange rate still took 
place sporadically. Starting from January 2006 in Bulgaria and January 2005 in 
Lithuania the exchange rate volatility equals zero. The calculated exchange rate 
volatility for Latvia, operating under narrow peg, meets the condition of only ±1% 
changes in the currency rate to euro. 
 
Table 3-2. Exchange rate volatility, index of speculative pressure and index of intervention for fixed 
exchange rate regime countries. 
 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
ISP variability 
Index of 
intervention 
Bulgaria 0.044 10.205 0.9764 
Latvia 0.705 13.462 0.9566 
Lithuania 0.056 10.296 0.9981 
Notes: as Table 3-1 
The presented results bring first insights with regard to monetary policy 
implementation and potential euro adoptions. Countries that carry out heavy exchange 
rate market interventions have to also bear high financial and organizational costs of 
the market interference. Thus, giving up the own currency can be advantageous 
especially for Romania, but also for Czech Republic, and Hungary. High variability of 
the market pressure also can be treated as an argument for euro adoptions. 
However, in order to bring more insight to the reasons for aforementioned results 
on each country exchange rate market volatility and interventions and draw justified 
implications for euro adoption, there is a need to further study two issues. First, 
regarding the exchange rate volatility, it is important to discern whether the sources of 
volatility are mainly of domestic or of foreign origin. The importance of domestic sources 
calls for monetary union accession as a solution which helps dispose of damaging 
exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, dominance of foreign sources of variability 
may mean that floating exchange rate is playing its role as shock absorber well and 
resignation from it might have negative impact on the economy.  
Second, it is informative to understand the reasons behind the foreign market 
interventions. Generally speaking, there are two main causes of heavy interventions 
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taking place. The first one is large fluctuations of the currency taking place and the 
second is large influence of exchange rate changes on the economy. Depending on 
whether only one or both reasons hold in the country, the implications for euro 
adoptions change slightly. While active currency stabilization can mean difficulties in 
introduction of a currency to ERM II system, due to potential problems with keeping it 
within predetermined bands, euro adoption in such case is a favourable option. Thanks 
to abandoning own currency the need to heavily interfere on the foreign exchange 
market disappears, together with the costs that such interventions bring. If exchange 
rate fluctuations additionally have large negative impact on the domestic economy, 
benefits coming from euro adoption are even larger. 
In order to answer the first question, on the sources of exchange rate market 
fluctuations, I carry out variance-covariance decomposition analysis. Table 3-3 shows 
the percentage of each country exchange rate forecast error variance that can be 
explained with foreign and domestic shocks. The results imply that except for Czech 
Republic where domestic factors play decisively the most important role, other countries 
present ambivalent results. While domestic factors seem to be responsible for the 
majority of fluctuations, the difference with the foreign factors share is not high.  
What’s more, the large share of domestic shocks comes from exchange rate’s own 
shocks. With the model applied in here it is not possible to discern whether these 
exchange rate shocks arise from domestic or foreign conditions. However, market 
sentiment regarding world as well as domestic economic conditions, political and 
geopolitical concerns or expectations regarding future monetary policy changes can be 
given as possible examples for the sources of the exchange rate variations not controlled 
in this model. As large part of them is connected to foreign rather than domestic issues, 
it can be possibly stated that larger part of exchange rate volatility has its sources in 
foreign variables.  
High part of exchange rate variance being explained with its own shocks can also be 
interpreted as exchange rate moving largely due to unpredictable factors and own 
destabilizing shocks. Either way, such fluctuations increase macroeconomic uncertainty 
and volatility. Thus, the large share of exchange rate volatility due to both foreign 
shocks and its own shocks imply that resignation from domestic currency and 
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substituting it with euro could mean important gains for the economy. 
 
Table 3-3. Variance-covariance decompositions of exchange rate due to foreign and domestic conditions 
Country Period 
Foreign 
variables 
Domestic variables 
All 
Exchange 
rate 
Czech 
Republic 
6 24.144 75.856 27.263 
12 27.436 72.564 19.474 
24 35.732 64.268 17.219 
36 37.123 62.877 16.768 
Hungary 
6 37.878 62.122 49.707 
12 37.646 62.354 42.326 
24 39.966 60.034 39.695 
36 40.848 59.152 39.057 
Poland 
6 37.608 62.392 35.895 
12 45.698 54.302 22.443 
24 43.623 56.377 15.809 
36 44.562 55.438 14.043 
Romania 
6 33.795 66.205 52.774 
12 43.327 56.673 44.261 
24 47.497 52.503 40.086 
36 50.081 49.919 37.914 
 
Next, I turn to the explanation of potential reasons for foreign market interventions 
taking place in CEE countries. In case of the fixed exchange rate regime countries the 
answer is simple as countries have to keep predetermined level of exchange rate. In the 
floating exchange rate regime countries the situation is more complicated. While index 
of intervention for Poland does not show any evidence of exchange rate interventions 
taking place, Poland is a country with largest exchange rate volatility and highest 
variability of market pressure on currency. Therefore, it is impossible to explain foreign 
exchange rate interventions with only the level of exchange rate variability. Thus, I 
compare the impact of each country exchange rate changes on the domestic economies, 
using again variance-covariance decomposition analysis. 
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Table 3-4 contains the percentages of domestic variables’ variation that can be 
explained with exchange rate shocks. The results imply that exchange rate does not 
considerably influence domestic real economy. Influence on output is rather negligent in 
the considered countries. There is significant impact on inflation only in case of Poland, 
and Hungary to some extent.  
 
Table 3-4. Variance-covariance decompositions of domestic variables due to exchange rate shocks. 
 
Period Output Inflation 
Interest 
rate 
Intervention 
Czech 
Republic 
12 1.670 3.285 14.752 6.983 
24 2.632 2.919 21.414 6.889 
36 4.120 2.779 20.823 5.736 
min 0.595 0.482 0.010 0.261 
max 4.120 3.285 21.493 7.243 
Hungary 
12 2.986 11.518 13.722 21.741 
24 3.010 9.636 12.874 21.237 
36 3.101 8.997 12.855 23.408 
min 1.082 0.012 3.801 0.175 
max 3.101 11.518 13.980 23.408 
Poland 
12 1.783 16.277 6.500 2.239 
24 1.478 19.776 10.502 5.490 
36 1.030 18.709 10.468 7.487 
min 0.518 0.615 0.041 1.319 
max 1.909 19.830 10.661 7.487 
Romania 
12 5.081 3.066 14.653 2.347 
24 5.978 4.521 15.047 1.146 
36 5.930 5.361 15.116 0.734 
min 2.198 0.061 4.980 0.734 
max 6.001 5.361 15.116 4.489 
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The results provide also a piece of information on the role of exchange rate in the 
domestic monetary policy. Domestic interest rate changes occur due to exchange rate 
shocks mostly in Czech Republic but also in other countries the influence is hard to 
ignore. Finally, the analysis reveals that foreign exchange rate market interventions 
occur due to exchange rate fluctuations especially in Hungary. In other countries there 
is only slight evidence of exchange rate shocks being important reason for foreign 
interventions taking place. 
The variance-covariance decomposition results reveal that exchange rate shocks do 
not influence domestic economy considerably. What’s more, foreign interventions seem 
to occur due to high currency fluctuations only in case of Hungary. Therefore, these 
results provide only very limited answer to the question on the reasons for foreign 
interventions in CEE countries. If market interference of authorities does not take place 
because of neither high influence of exchange rate on the economy nor high exchange 
rate shocks, there is a need to look for other reasons. One of the clues might be high 
influence of exchange rate shocks on its own variability. As mentioned above, such 
situation might be interpreted as exchange rate moving mostly due to unpredictable 
fluctuations which increase overall macroeconomic volatility. The present analysis does 
not provide evidence on that volatility influencing output or inflation variables. 
However, authorities might still decide on foreign market interventions aiming to 
pre-emptively limit that volatility and market uncertainty. 
 
4. Role of autonomic monetary policy in euro area shock transmission 
In this section I study the role of domestic monetary policy changes in the 
transmission of euro area output, inflation, and monetary policy shocks. I look at the 
effects of the overall monetary policy and then I study also the relative importance of 
exchange rate and interest rate changes in the shock transmission. This analysis will 
bring the answer on a question whether independent monetary policy is really able to 
absorb foreign shocks, and thus provide implications on the costs of giving it up and 
joining monetary union. 
As Artis and Ehrmann (2006) argue, the study on the role of exchange rate as shock 
absorber is of importance only when the economies are affected by asymmetrical shocks. 
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The growth rate and shock correlation analysis carried out in Chapter 1 reveals that 
only very low levels of correlation can be observed for output and inflation shocks 
between euro area and individual CEE countries. Especially for inflation shocks there 
are even cases of negative correlation coefficients. Therefore, I can conclude that shocks 
occurring in euro area and individual CEE countries are largely asymmetric so that the 
analysis on the monetary policy role in euro area shock transmission to CEE countries 
is justified. 
In order to study this problem I implement introduced by Bernanke et al. (1997) 
and Sims and Zha (2006) counter-factual simulation analysis. This method fixes 
considered variable (exchange rate or interest rate in this case) at its base values 
throughout the simulation, i.e. creates a situation with absence of endogenous reactions 
of the considered variable to the shocks. Responses of other variables when the 
considered variable cannot change constitute for responses in the situation when 
examined variable does not transmit shocks. Therefore, comparison of responses of 
output and inflation in the constrained and unconstrained model shows how important 
is the constrained variable in the transmission of the shocks. Additionally, through 
comparison of relative strengths of the responses one is able to tell whether the changes 
in the considered variable work as absorber or additional source of the shocks to the 
economy. 
The first question I ask is whether overall changes in domestic monetary policy 
variables extend influence on the transmission of euro area shocks to CEE economies. 
As domestic monetary policy variables I treat interest rate, exchange rate as well as 
foreign exchange market intervention. To answer the above question I carry out 
counter-factual simulation analysis in order to determine how responses of each country 
output and inflation in the studied countries differ between the case when monetary 
policy changes normally and the case when neither of monetary policy variables 
responds to the endogenous shocks. Even though it is far from being perfect, such 
modelling can be interpreted as the situation after euro adoption when country loses its 
domestic monetary policy instruments. 
Then, I check whether it is mainly interest rate or exchange rate changes that 
determine the monetary policy effects in the shock transmission. Therefore, I also 
80 
 
present counter-factual simulation analysis results for a model where only interest rate 
or only exchange rate is fixed at its base values through the simulation. Comparing 
these alternative responses with counter-factual response where all monetary policy 
variables are restricted at the same time shows which instrument – interest rate or 
exchange rate – plays more important role in the shock transmission. In other words, it 
allows for determination whether it is mainly central bank autonomic policy decision 
(interest rate changes) or automatic market adjustment (exchange rate changes) that 
really matters for monetary policy role after foreign macroeconomic and monetary 
policy shocks. The analysis also lets determine the character of the instruments’ role – 
of either a shock absorber or a source of additional shocks to the economy. 
Figures 3-1a to 3-1c present results of the counter-factual simulation analysis. The 
blue solid line presents responses for the benchmark model where all the variables react 
normally. The red marked line shows responses of the variables in case where no 
monetary policy response is taking place (interest rate, intervention, and exchange rate 
variables are all fixed at their base values). The two black marked lines draw the 
responses in scenarios where either interest rate (circle marker) or exchange rate (star 
marker) do not react and thus do not transmit the shocks. 
The results imply that autonomic monetary policy changes certainly matter for 
transmission of euro area shocks to the CEE economies but a lot depends on a country, a 
source of a shock as well as a responding variable. After euro area output shock 
monetary policy matters especially in Poland and Romania. In these two countries 
considerable differences between benchmark and alternative scenario responses are 
observable. Independent monetary policy changes allow for higher output increase after 
positive euro area output shock. On the other hand, they depress inflation as compared 
to the scenario without monetary policy changes. In Czech Republic and Hungary, 
monetary policy does not seem to matter for EA output shock transmission to domestic 
output and hold only slight meaning for transmission to inflation. The direction of 
influence is the same as in case of Poland and Romania, with inflation being higher in 
scenario without independent monetary policy changes. 
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Figure 3-1a. Role of monetary policy and its instruments: interest rates and exchange rates in euro 
area output shock transmission to CEE countries’ output and inflation. 
 
Note: Counter-factual simulation analysis results; blue line – base scenario response, shaded area – 
base scenario 90% confidence area; red marked line – no monetary policy response scenario; black 
marked lines – no monetary policy instruments responses scenarios (circle marker – no exchange rate, 
star marker – no interest rate) 
 
Monetary policy seems to play more important role for transmission of euro area 
inflationary shocks. After unexpected inflation increase in euro area the shock is 
transmitted to all countries’ output and inflation and domestic monetary policy plays 
significant role in determination of the magnitude of the extended effects. In many 
cases the alternative scenario response is even outside base scenario confidence bands. 
The effects of the monetary policy on the direction of response are more mixed than in 
case of euro area output shocks. While in Poland and Czech Republic autonomic 
monetary policy depresses output increase after the shock, in Hungary and Romania 
the opposite is true. Monetary policy matters only slightly for the reaction of inflation in 
Czech Republic and Romania, limiting inflation increase after the shock. On the other 
hand, in Hungary and Poland base-scenario inflation increase is higher.  
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Figure 3-1b. Role of monetary policy and its instruments: interest rates and exchange rates in euro 
area inflation shock transmission to CEE countries’ output and inflation. 
 
Note: as in Figure 3-1a 
 
The role of monetary policy in output and inflation reactions to euro area monetary 
policy shocks also differs considerably across the countries. While in Czech Republic the 
influence is barely visible, in the remaining countries differences between the base and 
alternative responses are clear. In all the cases domestic output and inflation would be 
higher (i.e. would not fall as much) if monetary policy did not react to endogenous 
shocks. It might mean monetary authorities in CEE countries following the decisions of 
ECB and/or exchange rate moving so that they contribute to further decrease in 
domestic output and inflation after euro area contradictory monetary policy shock. 
Summing up, monetary policy changes play important role in the euro area shocks 
transmission to the domestic economy. From the considered countries, importance of 
monetary policy seems to be lowest in Czech Republic. On the other hand, Poland is the 
country where monetary policy affects both output and inflation reactions after all kind 
of euro area shocks. For Hungary and Romania there are some cases where monetary 
policy does not play considerable role in the shock transmission. 
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Figure 3-1c. Role of monetary policy and its instruments: interest rates and exchange rates in euro 
area monetary policy shock transmission to CEE countries’ output and inflation. 
 
Note: as in Figure 3-1a 
 
Now, I look again at Figures 3-1a to 3-1c in order to compare the relative strength 
and the role of the two monetary policy instruments – interest rate and exchange rate – 
in euro area shock transmission.  
Interest rate changes seem to be the most important factor in transmission of euro 
area output shocks to domestic output in case of Poland, while for Romania exchange 
rate matters more in this case. Changes in interest rates after the shock contribute to 
output increase in Poland but in Hungary and Romania they limit output growth. It 
means central bank in Poland taking pro-cyclical and central banks in Hungary and 
Romania taking counter-cyclical decisions in the face of the shocks. That the final effect 
of monetary policy changes is the same in Poland and Romania is due to exchange rate 
changes which do not matter much for the shock transmission in the former country but 
contribute to output increase in the latter (being at the same time strong enough to 
offset interest rate influence).  
For the inflation responses to euro area output shock, both interest rate and 
exchange rate changes seem to matter equally in Hungary, Poland, and Romania, both 
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depressing inflation level. In Czech Republic exchange rate is the main determinant of 
monetary policy limiting inflation growth while interest rate works in the opposite 
direction.  
After euro area inflationary shock output responses in Czech Republic and Poland 
are highly influenced by both interest rate and exchange rate changes. They work 
together depressing output increase after the shock. In Romania exchange rate 
adjustments limit output increase after the shock but influence of interest rate, working 
in the opposite direction, is stronger, resulting in overall monetary policy effect in 
favour of output growth. Monetary policy pushes up output also in Hungary but in case 
of this country it is exchange rate that plays the most important role while interest rate 
influence is negligent. 
Inflation growth in Hungary and Poland after euro area inflationary shocks occurs 
mainly due to exchange rate changes. In both countries interest rates work rather 
counter-cyclically, depressing the growth of inflation rate but they are not strong 
enough to influence the overall monetary policy effect. Interest rate changes play 
dominant role in Czech Republic where it also stays in opposition to exchange rate 
influence and manage to limit slightly inflation increase. The situation in Romania is 
hard to interpret, with both interest rate and exchange rate working in opposite 
direction than the overall monetary policy changes. One of the possible interpretations 
might be the role played by foreign exchange rate market interventions which I do not 
check in here.  
Finally, for the euro area monetary policy transmission to CEE countries’ output, 
the results imply dominant role of interest rate changes in Czech Republic and Poland. 
However, the direction of influence is opposite in the countries, with interest rate (and 
the overall monetary policy) limiting output fall in the former country and further 
depressing it in the latter. In Hungary and Romania both interest rate and exchange 
rate changes matter for output reactions. As in the case of Poland, their changes after 
the shocks are pro-cyclical, further depressing output after euro area monetary 
contraction. 
Interest rate is also the main determinant of monetary policy role in the 
transmission of euro area monetary shocks to inflation in Romania. In Czech Republic 
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and Hungary exchange rate plays the most important role. In Poland both are 
important drivers of monetary policy effects, with interest rate working more up to 20th 
month after the shock and exchange rate extending higher influence later on. 
Summing up the results, with few exceptions (mainly Czech Republic case), after 
euro area inflation and monetary policy shocks exchange rate channel is more 
important than interest rate channel for the shock transmission to both output and 
inflation. On the other hand, after euro area output shocks it is interest rate that 
usually plays more important role. What’s more, Czech Republic is the only country 
where exchange rate fluctuations are noticeably less responsible for the transmission 
than interest rates.  
Furthermore, no clear patterns are visible on the direction of monetary influence. 
After euro area monetary policy shocks monetary policy works as additional source of 
output and inflation fall in all the countries but Czech Republic. After euro area output 
shocks monetary policy depresses inflation in all countries and boosts output increase 
everywhere except for Hungary. After euro area inflation shocks monetary policy effects 
are most mixed, depressing Czech output and inflation, Polish output, and Romanian 
inflation, and raising the variables in other cases. 
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
This chapter provides the analysis of domestic monetary policies in chosen CEE 
countries in the context of the spill-over of euro area shocks to the economy and euro 
adoptions. First, using various measures introduced in previous studies, I describe each 
country exchange rate market situation, from the perspective of the exchange rate 
volatility, market pressures as well as foreign exchange market interventions. Then, I 
carry out counter-factual simulation analysis in order to analyse the role of monetary 
policy generally, and interest rate and exchange rate particularly, in the transmission of 
euro area output, inflation, and monetary policy shocks to CEE economies. 
Through this study I am able to draw few important conclusions and implications 
for both present monetary policies and future euro adoptions. First, for the case of 
domestic monetary policies I find that exchange rate fluctuations have rather low 
impact on the domestic real economy and only in case of Hungary they seem to be 
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important driver for foreign exchange market fluctuations. Most of the interventions 
seem to take place due to large share of exchange rate volatility explained by 
fluctuations of unpredictable nature that may cause macroeconomic instability. 
However, while Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania might intervene in the foreign 
exchange market due to this reason, Polish authorities seem to not attach particular 
importance to this problem. This may point at Polish economy being more resistant to 
the unexpected economic volatility than other CEE countries. The size of the economy 
as compared to its neighbouring countries might be one of the reasons. The other might 
be difficulties and probable low effectiveness of the interventions on the relatively big 
Polish currency market. 
When it comes to the euro area shocks transmission to the domestic economy, I find 
that in many cases monetary policy acts pro-cyclically, further depressing (supporting) 
already falling (increasing) output and inflation. What’s more, in many cases this 
procyclicality occurs not only due to autonomic exchange rate changes but also decisions 
made by central banks on interest rate levels. The reason for that in case of monetary 
policy shocks might be CEE countries following ECB monetary policy decisions. In case 
of output and inflation shocks, it is harder to find an explanation but one of the 
plausible reasons might be the possibility that central banks pay more attention to 
domestic economic situation and domestic shocks. Because, as shown in Chapter 1, 
especially in case of inflation the correlations of the shocks are not high, the situation 
can occur when central banks acting counter-cyclically toward domestic economy 
changes at the same time act pro-cyclically toward euro area economic shocks. 
When it comes to implications for euro adoptions, I find arguments both for and 
against adoption of the common currency. High exchange rate volatility due to foreign 
factors as well as exchange rate own shocks can serve as argument for giving up own 
currency. Active currency stabilization taking place in Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Romania has twofold interpretation. On the one hand, it is a sound argument for joining 
monetary union. Adopting common currency would mean elimination of the costs 
connected with foreign exchange market interventions. On the other hand, if the 
currency fluctuations are being kept down with the interventions now, it might be 
difficult to stabilize it without foreign exchange market interference and therefore 
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introduce currency into ERM II mechanism and keep it there for at least two years 
before euro adoption.  
Finally, the finding that monetary policies in many CEE countries behave often 
rather pro-cyclically in the face of foreign shocks acts as an argument for euro adoptions 
in CEE countries. Losing autonomic monetary policy is one of the main costs of euro 
adoption in the case when it works as shock absorber and stabilization mechanism. 
However, in case of CEE countries both central banks’ decisions regarding interest rate 
levels as well as automatic exchange rate responses often act as additional source of the 
shocks to the economy. In such situation giving up own monetary policy does not 
constitute for such a heavy loss. 
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Appendix.                                   
Influence of the loss of independent monetary policies in 
CEE countries on shock responses as compared to euro 
area aggregate responses 
 
In Chapter 3 of the thesis I study the role of monetary policy in transmission of euro 
area output, inflation, and monetary policy shocks to Central and Eastern European 
countries. Using counter-factual simulation analysis of the VAR framework I present 
how transmission of the shocks changes between scenarios with and without 
autonomous monetary policy response.  
Now, the question arises how the changes in transmission mechanism after giving up 
own monetary policy instruments influence the conclusions of the analysis carried out 
in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. In these chapters I study the relative magnitude and speed 
of adjustment after euro area shocks between individual CEE countries responses and 
aggregate euro area reaction. The analysis provides insight on the problems of business 
cycles synchronization and dependence on euro area macroeconomic and monetary 
situation in the CEE countries that are often studied in the context of joining monetary 
union. The advantage of the analysis is that it bases on the actual data and that results 
do not depend strongly on the constraints imposed by model identification scheme. On 
the other hand, however, such an approach is backward-looking and does not take into 
consideration potential changes in the transmission mechanism after euro adoption and 
giving up autonomous monetary policy.  
In order to partly solve the problems that these limitations bring, in this appendix I 
carry out analysis analogical to the ones in Chapters 1 and 2 – comparing each country 
responses with aggregate euro area one, using counter-factual scenario responses for 
CEE countries instead of the base model ones. The advantages and disadvantages of 
this approach are opposite to the approach adopted in the first two chapters. This 
analysis takes into consideration potential future changes in the transmission 
mechanism, showing the possible changes in the relative shock magnitude and 
adjustment at the time after euro adoption. At the same time, however, the results 
depend more strongly on the model specification and chosen restrictions. As already 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the chosen identification scheme of no monetary policy 
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reactions can be interpreted as the situation after euro adoption but there is a need to 
take it with a grain of salt.  
Nonetheless, while aware of these problems and limitations, I move on to the 
analysis. Table A1 presents the differences between responses of CEE countries 
variables and aggregate euro area variables to the euro area shocks. The differences are 
calculated for two scenarios: benchmark scenario where all variables in the model 
respond to the shocks and alternative scenario where monetary policy variables do not 
transmit the shocks. The negative sign means that CEE country variable response is 
lower than aggregate euro area response and the positive sign that the CEE variable 
reaction is higher than the one of euro area variable. The responses are derived with the 
model used in Chapter 1 and 2 – the block-exogenous VAR framework. 
While comparing the results I take notice of the three aspects. The first one is the 
absolute size of the difference – the absolute gap in responses between euro area and 
individual CEE countries in the base and the alternative scenario. The gap increasing 
in alternative scenario as compared to the base means that giving up monetary policy 
widens distance with euro area when it comes to the shock magnitude, implying costs of 
losing the policy. Lower value in the alternative scenario shows that loss of independent 
monetary policy works in favour of synchronization with euro area. 
The second issue is the sign of the differences in the benchmark and alternative 
scenarios. The change in sign taking place informs that the relative strength of response 
changes with the loss of domestic monetary policy. With this, I am able to tell whether 
the loss of monetary policy weakens or strengthens the CEE country output and 
inflation responses as compared to the aggregate euro area responses, or whether the 
relative strength is unaffected. 
The third problem concerns the similarities in the speed of adjustment to the shocks. 
Comparing the direction of changes in the values can be informative about the relative 
process of adjustment. If the pattern of change of the calculated differences is similar 
through the response period in both base and alternative scenario, the loss of monetary 
policy does not influence the overall pattern of variable adjustment to the shocks.  
There is also a connected problem of similarity of the impulse response function 
shapes between euro area and CEE countries. Information on that can be inferred from 
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the sizes of differences between CEE country and euro area responses through the 
considered period. If they remain constant or change only slightly, both countries’ 
variables adjust to the shocks in the similar manner. Large increases or decreases in the 
presented values point at the variables responding in the different manner to the 
shocks.  
Moving to the interpretation of the presented values, the results on the absolute size 
of differences between the two scenarios are highly mixed. Starting from output 
responses to euro area output shock, the gap with euro area is bigger in the base 
scenario in Czech Republic only. In other countries the response differs more from the 
euro area one when monetary policy does not transmit shocks. It means that in these 
three countries loss of monetary policy brings a cost of lower similarity in business cycle 
and only in Czech Republic giving up monetary policy would be beneficial in this matter. 
Results on the CEE-euro area responses’ gap for inflation bring similar conclusions 
as in case of output for Hungary, and Poland. On the other hand, in Czech Republic and  
Romania losing autonomic monetary policy brings narrowing of the difference in shock 
responses after euro area output shock, improving their situation as compared to the 
time with own monetary policy. 
Next, after euro area inflation shocks output reaction differences are usually higher 
in the alternative scenario in Czech Republic and Poland. In case of Hungary and 
Romania the situation improves when it loses its monetary policy instruments. The 
gaps of inflation reactions show the same patterns as output in case of Hungary. In 
Czech Republic and Poland too, similarly to output response the gap is bigger in the 
alternative scenario. The Romanian situation is more complicated but the average 
differences point at the conclusion of the loss of monetary policy bringing negative 
effects of wider gaps in responses. 
Finally, after euro area monetary policy shock domestic monetary policy contributes 
to deeper output fall in Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Without own monetary 
policy the output response would be closer to the euro area one. In case of Romanian 
output the opposite is true – gap widens when monetary policy cannot respond to the 
shocks. The inflation case is the same as output in Hungary only – again monetary 
policy contributes to the wider gap. In Romania the situation changes completely and 
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becomes the same in Hungary. In Czech Republic and Poland loss of monetary policy 
seems to bring higher gap. Generally, there seems not to be the large difference between 
the scenarios with and without monetary policy responses. 
When it comes to the second problem – the changes in differences’ signs between the 
two scenarios, there are not many such cases taking place. They occur especially in case 
of Polish output after euro area output and monetary policy shocks. While in the 
benchmark case Polish output response is higher than euro area output response, it 
becomes lower when monetary policy does not transmit shocks anymore. What’s more, 
after monetary policy shock the fall in output becomes lower than in euro area with no 
monetary policy response. Besides these cases, there are only few few-period-long 
changes in the relative strength of reactions between euro area and CEE countries. In 
most of the cases the relative magnitude of responses stays unchanged regardless of the 
monetary policy transmitting shocks or not.  
Finally, when it comes to the pattern of adjustment to the shocks, it seems that 
monetary policy changes do not influence the patterns in the great manner. After euro 
area output shocks, the process of adjustment seems largely similar in both base and 
alternative scenario for Czech Republic and Hungary, with Romania showing slight 
change in case of inflation (alternative scenario seems to be closer to euro area 
aggregate response), and Polish transmission mechanism changing most (base scenario 
being more similar in case of output, and both scenarios being highly dissimilar for 
inflation).  
After euro area inflation shock, Czech Republic and Romania show rather similar 
patterns of responses in both scenarios. In Hungary and Poland lack of monetary policy 
means change in the pattern of adjustment. In the former country no monetary policy 
scenario seems to increase similarity when compared to aggregate euro area. In Poland 
adjustment in base scenario seems to be closer to euro area one. 
After euro area monetary policy shocks, Czech Republic again shows the most 
similar pattern of adjustment regardless of monetary policy response being present or 
not. In Hungary and Romania the adjustment is only slightly different and seems again 
to differ most in case of Poland. 
With the analysis I am able to provide conclusions on the changes in CEE countries’ 
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dependency on euro area output and inflation as well as monetary policy shocks after 
giving up independent monetary policies. Thus, I am able to verify some of observations 
made in Chapters 1 and 2. 
After euro area output shocks, no monetary policy scenario means usually higher 
distance between individual country and aggregate euro area responses. While 
individual country output responses to the shocks are usually similar with euro area in 
the base model, the loss of monetary policy causes the differences to increase. In case of 
inflation even base model results are non-similar but the gap becomes even higher when 
monetary policy does not react to the shocks. When it comes to the process of 
adjustment to the shocks, the results imply that conclusions from Chapter 1 still hold 
for Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania with the countries showing large 
similarities in output adjustment. However, in case of Poland the loss of monetary 
policy seems to change the pattern of adjustment considerably, for the worse. 
Dissimilarity of inflation responses in all the countries does not disappear even in 
no-monetary-policy scenario. 
Chapter 1 shows that, after euro area inflation shocks, output responses are 
significantly different in CEE countries as compared to euro area. Loss of independent 
monetary policies increases this gap in Poland and narrows in other countries. The 
speed of adjustment to the shocks remains very similar in both scenarios, i.e. regardless 
of monetary policy reactions taking place or not the adjustment of output to inflation 
shock proceeds very differently. The inflation reactions are largely similar across the 
countries in the base scenario and the loss of monetary policy does not change the 
situation considerably. In Hungary and partly in Romania the gap in magnitude 
becomes even smaller. 
In comparison to the results from Chapter 2, when domestic monetary policy does 
not transmit shocks, the size of the effects of monetary policy shocks on output becomes 
closer to euro area in Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. For inflation there is 
hardly any change between the scenario with and without independent monetary policy 
in Czech Republic the gap becomes closer in Hungary and Romania, and wider in 
Poland. The process of adjustment stays largely similar in Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Romania, and changes more only in Poland. On the whole, even after loss of 
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independent monetary policies, the responses of countries’ output and inflation seem to 
be quite similar to aggregate euro area responses (with exception for Czech inflation 
which tends to differ more). 
Overall, the analysis in this appendix broadly confirms previous observations and 
conclusions from Chapters 1 and 2. For macroeconomic shocks, there are some cases 
where the view becomes more pessimistic, especially when it comes to the differences in 
magnitude of reactions. For monetary policy shocks, in most of the cases the loss of 
domestic monetary policies seems to work even in favour of the likeness of responses. 
 
Table A1. Differences between individual CEE country and aggregate euro area reactions in scenarios 
with and without domestic monetary policy responses. 
Euro area output shocks 
 
Output responses gaps 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania 
Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive 
12 0.792 0.773 0.033 0.107 -0.112 -0.283 -0.116 -0.158 
24 0.585 0.527 0.043 0.050 0.249 -0.268 -0.005 -0.047 
36 0.475 0.434 0.068 0.080 0.189 -0.182 -0.017 -0.059 
avg 0.575 0.551 0.087 0.111 0.059 -0.241 -0.080 -0.123 
  
  
  
Inflation responses gaps 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania 
Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive 
12 -0.150 -0.142 -0.063 -0.105 -0.218 -0.169 -0.044 -0.012 
24 -0.139 -0.140 -0.020 -0.028 -0.181 -0.316 -0.049 -0.021 
36 -0.192 -0.193 0.016 0.008 -0.071 -0.359 -0.007 -0.007 
avg -0.138 -0.135 -0.020 -0.042 -0.152 -0.232 -0.027 -0.008 
 
  
94 
 
Euro area inflation shocks 
 
Output responses gaps 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania 
Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive 
12 0.476 0.496 0.210 -0.057 0.558 0.553 0.545 0.361 
24 0.205 0.233 0.202 -0.013 0.119 0.366 0.291 0.094 
36 0.166 0.145 0.138 0.005 0.120 0.234 0.145 0.019 
avg 0.281 0.278 0.166 -0.046 0.291 0.391 0.374 0.223 
  
  
  
Inflation responses gaps 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania 
Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive 
12 -0.007 -0.020 0.251 -0.016 0.006 -0.133 -0.099 -0.123 
24 -0.057 -0.066 0.226 0.047 0.060 -0.013 0.138 0.009 
36 -0.072 -0.080 0.160 0.038 0.001 0.040 0.219 0.051 
avg -0.041 -0.051 0.153 -0.015 -0.004 -0.071 -0.006 -0.086 
 
Euro area monetary policy shocks 
 
Output responses gaps 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania 
Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive 
12 -0.307 -0.261 -0.117 -0.007 -0.176 0.005 0.041 0.314 
24 -0.200 -0.045 0.018 0.078 -0.158 0.078 0.068 0.199 
36 -0.232 -0.170 -0.065 -0.018 -0.225 0.002 -0.058 -0.024 
avg -0.268 -0.193 -0.048 0.038 -0.172 0.003 0.045 0.225 
  
  
  
Inflation responses gaps 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania 
Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive Base 
Alterna
tive 
12 0.179 0.167 -0.102 -0.018 0.055 0.076 -0.082 0.011 
24 0.134 0.138 -0.065 0.019 -0.007 0.120 -0.127 0.019 
36 0.120 0.125 -0.001 0.042 0.001 0.142 -0.093 0.033 
avg 0.116 0.116 -0.079 -0.016 0.003 0.080 -0.095 0.007 
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Conclusion                                  
Summary and implications for domestic policies as well 
as euro adoption 
 
In this thesis I study the transmission of euro area macroeconomic and monetary 
conditions to chosen Central and Eastern European countries. As a motivation for this 
analysis I name proceeding globalization and caused by it international spill-overs of 
the macroeconomic shocks as well as European Union accession and obligation of future 
euro adoptions in CEE countries. Based on such a background, in this thesis I study the 
effects of euro area output and inflation shocks as well as monetary policy shocks in 
Central and Eastern European countries. I investigate the issues connected to the costs 
and benefits of currency union formation, putting stress on the business cycles 
synchronization and monetary transmission problems as well as the role of domestic 
monetary policy in adjustment to foreign shocks. 
Chapter 1 provides information on the incidence of macroeconomic disturbances 
between euro area and CEE countries as well as transmission of euro area real economy 
shocks. Basing on correlation analysis and VAR framework, in this chapter I provide 
evidence on the incidence of disturbances affecting CEE countries and euro area as a 
whole as well as on the relative size and speed of adjustments to the shocks. I also look 
for the potential determinants of the results in CEE countries’ characteristics regarding 
overall openness, relations with euro area and financial markets’ depth and 
development. 
Chapter 2 studies the issue connected to the global spill-overs of monetary policy 
effects. While investigating the effects of euro area monetary policy shocks on CEE 
economies, I concentrate on the three main issues: strength of ECB’s policy impact as 
compared to domestic monetary policy effects, strength of ECB’s policy impact in each 
country as compared with aggregate euro area reaction, and the differences in the shock 
transmission between floating and fixed exchange rate regime countries.  
In Chapter 3 I assess the importance of monetary policy in euro area shock 
transmission to the CEE countries. Independent monetary policy and floating exchange 
rate regime are often assigned an important role in adjustment of domestic economy to 
the foreign shocks. However, some empirical studies provide evidence on the exchange 
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rate contributing to the domestic economic fluctuations. Therefore, as CEE countries 
are legally obliged to adopt euro and thus bear costs of giving up their own monetary 
policies, the understanding of the role of monetary policy in foreign shock transmission 
is of the utmost importance for them. 
In the appendix, in order to introduce more forward-looking aspect to the analysis 
in Chapters 1 and 2, I use the counter-factual simulation analysis from Chapter 3 and 
briefly compare the differences between aggregate euro area and individual CEE 
country responses to the euro area shocks in the scenarios with and without domestic 
monetary policy reactions. I take notice of the three aspects: the absolute size of the 
differences, the sign of the differences, and the similarities in the speed of adjustment to 
the shocks. The analysis provides insight on the possible changes in the transmission 
mechanism that may take place after euro adoptions as well as verifies the main 
conclusions on the CEE countries’ dependency on euro area output and inflation as well 
as monetary policy shocks presented in Chapters 1 and 2. 
The results provided in each chapter up to now were mainly the general 
cross-country comparisons and conclusions on the studied issues. Therefore, in this final 
part of the thesis I want to provide individual country summaries and implications for 
euro adoptions coming from the carried out analysis.  
Starting with fixed exchange rate regime countries, currency board regime in 
Bulgaria is a strong argument for euro adoption due to the fact that it already restraints 
exchange rate volatility and does not allow carrying out independent monetary policy. 
Thus, the role of exchange rate and interest rate in shock transmission is negligent. The 
transmission mechanism of euro area shocks should not also change significantly even 
after joining the monetary union. What’s more, giving up own currency brings the 
advantage of discontinuing costly maintenance of the currency board system. The euro 
area interest rate shocks influence economy much harder than domestic interest rate 
which also reacts strongly after EONIA changes. Domestic output reacts to the shocks 
in a very similar way to euro area as a whole. Bulgaria has also strong correlation of 
output growth and inflation rates with euro area. After euro area output shocks both 
domestic output and inflation reacts in largely similar way to the monetary union. The 
potential arguments against euro area adoption concern mainly reactions of domestic 
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inflation to euro area inflation as well as monetary policy shocks where the process of 
adjustment to the shocks is considerably different from aggregate euro area one. There 
is also a problem of rather high uncertainty of inflation responses as well as negative 
correlation of inflation disturbances. 
Lithuania is another country with currency board regime and thus the arguments 
for euro adoptions connected to the issues of exchange rate and monetary policy roles 
hold in this case as well. In Lithuania too, euro area monetary policy shocks have 
considerably stronger effects on the economy than domestic interest rates. The interest 
rates follow EONIA changes even more persistently than in case of Bulgaria. Again, the 
effects of disturbances are highly similar to the aggregate euro area reaction. However, 
the dependence on real economy shocks does not look as good. Correlation of output 
growth rates is the lowest out of the considered countries, with inflation correlations 
also rather low. Output shocks also show very weak correlations but there is a plus of 
one of the highest (though still only at 10 per cent level) coincidence of inflation shocks. 
After euro area output shocks, Lithuanian output reacts similarly to euro area output 
but more important in case of common monetary policy reaction of inflation is 
considerably different. This is also the case after euro area monetary policy shocks. 
Only euro area inflation increase causes similar domestic inflation rise. Same as in 
Bulgaria, the inflation reactions have frequently very high standard deviations, 
pointing at the high uncertainty in predicting the reactions. 
The last of analysed fixed exchange rate regimes countries – Latvia – operates 
under hard peg to euro, with only ±1% fluctuation bands. The implications regarding 
the exchange rate and monetary policy role are close to the ones for the currency board 
countries, though one could expect slightly bigger change in the transmission 
mechanism after euro adoption. As in the two previous cases, euro area monetary policy 
shocks extend higher effects on domestic output and inflation than domestic interest 
rates which react to EONIA increase similarly to Bulgaria, with short significant rise. 
In case of Latvia both output and inflation change in a manner similar to aggregate 
euro area after monetary policy shocks. The output growth and inflation rates show 
high correlation with euro area. After euro area output shocks not only output adjusts 
similarly to euro area but also inflation shows similar reaction for the first few months. 
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After this, however, it falls deeply showing adjustment completely different from euro 
area inflation. Though, the very wide confidence bands make it difficult to draw clear 
conclusions. After euro area inflation increase, domestic inflation behaves comparably 
to euro area but output reaction is opposite.  
Next, I move to the summary of floating exchange rate regime countries. In their 
cases, besides the above-mentioned criteria it is also important to take into account 
results of the analysis carried out in Appendix, on the differences in shock transmission 
after losing independent monetary policy.  
Starting with Czech Republic, it displays high output growth and inflation 
correlations with euro area. After euro area output shocks both output and inflation (if 
exclude few-month-long fall) behave largely similar to aggregate euro area variables. 
Also after the monetary union inflation increase the Czech inflation follows closely. 
Euro area monetary policy shocks have also strong influence on Czech variables, in case 
of output even stronger than domestic policy and similar to aggregate euro area 
response. What’s more, domestic interest rate increases strongly and rather persistently 
after EONIA hike.  
The eventual problems regarding business cycles synchronization and shock 
transmission might lie in different output reaction after inflation shocks and rather 
wide confidence bands for inflation after output shocks. Domestic inflation reacts 
stronger after domestic monetary policy shocks than after euro area shocks and the 
latter reaction is highly dissimilar to aggregate euro area response. The values of 
output shocks incidence are rather low and for inflation – negative. 
Exchange rate volatility is rather low and most of it has origin in domestic sources. 
Monetary policy role in transmission of euro area shocks is rather limited but it behaves 
frequently counter-cyclically. Therefore, no high gains from euro adoption can be 
expected. However, loss of independent monetary policy seems to possibly narrow the 
gap between domestic and euro area variable responses, improving the economy fitness 
for monetary union.  
Hungary output growth is well-correlated with euro area but inflation rates tend to 
move rather differently. After euro area output shocks both domestic output and 
inflation seem to change in similar way to euro area variables. Monetary policy shocks 
99 
 
extend strong influence on domestic variables which responses are generally similar to 
aggregate euro area ones and similar or stronger than responses to domestic monetary 
policy shocks. 
The potential problems might lie in the reaction of output to euro area inflation 
shock which is opposite to the monetary union and also in inflation showing slightly 
different speed of adjustment to the shock. Inflation paths are also often largely 
uncertain due to high standard deviations.  
The volatility of exchange rate, as in case of Czech Republic, is rather small but in 
Hungary the high share of it comes from foreign sources. What’s more, exchange rate 
shocks are responsible for the large part of the variations. Exchange rate seems to play 
important role in domestic monetary policy making, extending influence both on 
interest rates and interventions. Monetary policy role in transmission of euro area 
output shocks is rather small and it acts rather counter-cyclically. However, after euro 
area inflation and monetary policy shocks, the role seems to be more important and 
frequently rather pro-cyclical, pointing at potential benefits from giving up domestic 
monetary policy. Especially, that adjustment to the shocks does not seem to change 
significantly, even if domestic monetary policy is not working, and if changes occur they 
are usually rather in favour of more similar adjustment. The magnitude of shocks might 
also become closer to the euro area one after inflation and monetary policy shocks. 
Poland also shows quite high correlations of output growth with euro area and also 
the highest among considered countries correlations of output and inflation shocks. 
After ECB monetary policy shocks domestic interest rate reacts strongly and 
persistently, and output and inflation reactions are largely similar to aggregate euro 
area responses. On the other hand, responses after euro area macroeconomic shocks are 
often dissimilar and domestic monetary policy has stronger impact on the output and 
inflation than euro area monetary policy shocks. 
Exchange rate volatility is highest out of analysed countries but Poland carries out 
almost no foreign market interventions. Large share of exchange rate volatility comes 
from its own shocks, with important role of foreign sources as well. Exchange rate 
variability does not seem to influence monetary policy decision making considerably but 
it has quite high impact on country inflation. In many cases monetary policy seems to be 
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contributing to the euro area shocks rather than absorbing them. However, the 
appendix results suggest that the gap between Polish and euro area response to the 
shocks might become wider and the pattern of adjustment might change for the worse – 
become less similar to aggregate euro area one – without domestic monetary policy. 
Thus, it seems that in this case pro-cyclical monetary policy works for and not against 
similarity of responses with euro area, making the loss of it a potential cost. 
Lastly, in Romania after euro area output shocks, domestic output reacts similar to 
the monetary union one but inflation response stays similar only for the first few 
months after which it starts falling deeply. Both output and inflation responses to the 
euro area inflation shocks are dissimilar to the monetary union aggregate. The 
situation after euro area monetary policy shocks is largely similar to the Polish one: 
similar output and inflation responses but domestic monetary policy having larger 
impact on the economy.  
Romania carries out heavy foreign exchange market interventions and exchange 
rate volatility has quite high impact on domestic interest rates. Large share of this 
volatility comes from exchange rate own shocks and foreign sources. As in Poland, 
monetary policy seems to play rather important role in euro area shock transmission 
and often it is the role of contributing to the shocks. All of these opt for euro adoption in 
Romania, though there is also the opposite implication coming from counter-cyclical role 
of monetary policy in transmission of euro area output and inflation shocks to domestic 
inflation. Even after losing own monetary policy the adjustment process to the shocks 
should not change considerably (especially not for the worse) and the gap of magnitude 
with euro area might narrow in some cases, making resignation from own monetary 
policy potentially beneficial. 
Summing up, fixed exchange rate regime countries seem to be naturally more 
predisposed to euro adoption due to very low costs connected to the loss of own monetary 
policy. Especially, Latvia seems to be best fitted for monetary union accession, followed 
by Lithuania. Bulgaria still needs more adjustment, especially when it comes to 
inflation responses. Though, differing inflation behaviour might also pose some 
problems for Lithuania.  
The assessment of floating exchange rate regime countries is more difficult. 
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Looking at the possible scenarios after joining monetary union, it seems that Poland 
would be worst off, with larger gaps in shock magnitude as compared to euro area and 
many less similar patterns of adjustment. Poland is also the country where domestic 
monetary policy plays the most important role for the output and inflation changes. 
Though, Polish interest rates follow changes in euro area interest rates, pointing at 
high dependence of domestic monetary conditions on the euro area ones.  
In other countries, the loss of own monetary policy seems to be beneficial, especially 
in Czech Republic where the adjustment process does not change much and Hungary 
where the speed of adjustment becomes often more similar. Taking into consideration 
also other factors, it seems that for Hungary euro adoption would be most beneficial, 
mainly due to high influence of exchange rate shocks on itself and domestic monetary 
policy, larger influence of ECB monetary policy on the economy and more consistent 
with the monetary union responses of inflation to euro area shocks. 
Also Romania seems to be able to benefit from giving up independent monetary 
policy, mainly when it comes to the magnitude of transmitted shocks effects and 
possibility of giving up heavy foreign exchange market interventions. However, the 
most problematic for this country seems to be low co-incidence and many dissimilar 
cases of adjustment to macroeconomic shocks.  
This thesis provides a range of implications regarding especially future euro 
adoptions in Central and Eastern European countries but also problem of the 
international transmission of the shocks. However, there are still important issues that 
I do not study in here. The first one is the role of domestic monetary policy in economic 
adjustment to the domestic shocks. Next comes the problem of the similarity of 
reactions to the other shocks that are common for euro area and CEE countries but do 
not originate in euro area, as for instance oil prices shocks. Third, the thesis only 
mentions briefly the possible determinants of the euro area influence in CEE countries 
while more detailed analysis on the channels of shock transmission might be of interest. 
Finally, this study is concerned only with the macroeconomic and monetary policy 
issues while for the problem of suitability for euro adoptions there is also a need for 
study on the other points mentioned by the OCA theory, like labour market flexibility or 
diversification of the economies.  
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Table C1. Summary of main results and implications for euro adoption by country 
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania 
Exchange rate regime Currency board 
to euro 
Managed float Managed float Peg to euro ±
1%  
Currency board 
to euro  
Free float Managed float 
Chapter 1 
Output correlation 0.7940 0.8815 0.9331 0.8376 0.6122 0.7591 0.7531 
Inflation correlation 0.6029 0.6544 0.2902 0.5348 0.4690 0.2339 0.2130 
Output shock 
correlation 
0.1739 0.1600 0.1982 0.1822 0.0530 0.3681 -0.1939 
Inflation shock 
correlation 
-0.2015 -0.2788 -0.1517 -0.0078 0.1042 0.1333 0.0306 
Effects of euro area 
output shocks 
Output: slightly 
stronger than 
EA; similar 
adjustment 
Inflation: first 
few months and 
two lasts years 
as EA; fall in 
the meantime 
Output: slightly 
weaker than 
EA; similar 
adjustment 
Inflation: first 
few months and 
two lasts years 
as EA; fall in 
the meantime 
Output: slightly 
weaker than 
EA; similar 
adjustment 
Inflation: 
similar to EA 
Output: slightly 
stronger than 
EA; similar 
adjustment 
Inflation: first 
few months as 
EA; then deep 
fall 
Output: slightly 
stronger than 
EA; similar 
adjustment 
Inflation: fall 
all the time 
Output: slightly 
weaker than 
EA; similar 
adjustment 
Inflation: slight 
fall all the time 
Output: slightly 
weaker than 
EA; similar 
adjustment 
Inflation: first 
few months as 
EA; then deep 
fall 
Effects of euro area 
inflation shocks 
Output: 
opposite to EA 
Inflation: fall at 
Output: 
opposite to EA 
Inflation: 
Output: 
opposite to EA 
Inflation: 
Output: 
opposite to EA 
Inflation: 
Output: 
opposite to EA 
Inflation: 
Output: 
opposite to EA 
Inflation: 
Output: 
opposite to EA 
Inflation: fall at 
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first; persistent 
increase later 
similar to EA slower and 
more persistent 
increase 
similar to EA similar to EA slower and 
more persistent 
increase 
first; persistent 
increase later 
Inflation responses 
confidence bands 
Rather wide       Rather wide 
after output 
shock      
Very wide after 
output shock       
Very wide after 
output shock       
Very wide 
bands        
Very wide after 
output shock        
Very wide after 
output shock       
Chapter 2 
EONIA shock vs. 
domestic shock 
Output: EA 
stronger 
Inflation: EA 
stronger 
Output: EA 
stronger 
Inflation: 
domestic 
stronger 
Output: EA 
stronger/simila
r 
Inflation: EA 
stronger 
Output: EA 
stronger 
Inflation: EA 
stronger 
Output: EA 
slightly 
stronger 
Inflation: EA 
stronger 
Output: 
domestic 
stronger 
Inflation: 
domestic 
stronger 
Output: 
domestic 
stronger 
Inflation: 
domestic 
stronger 
Interest rate 
responses to EONIA 
shocks 
High, short 
increase 
Slow, more 
persistent 
increase 
Short increase High, short 
increase 
High, slowly 
disappearing 
increase 
Slow, more 
persistent 
increase 
Short increase 
Effects as compared 
to aggregate EA 
Output: similar 
to EA but 
stronger 
Inflation: 
considerably 
different 
Output: similar 
to EA 
Inflation: 
considerably 
different 
Output: similar 
to EA 
Inflation: 
similar to EA 
Output: similar 
to EA 
Inflation: 
rather similar 
to EA 
Output: similar 
to EA 
Inflation: 
considerably 
different 
Output: similar 
to EA 
Inflation: 
rather similar 
to EA 
Output: similar 
to EA but 
weaker 
Inflation: 
similar to EA 
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Chapter 3 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
0.044% 1.342% 1.525% 0.705% 0.056% 2.102% 1.541% 
Exchange rate 
pressure variability 
10.205% 14.172% 17.929% 13.462% 10.296% 20.407% 19.713% 
Foreign interventions 0.9764 0.195 0.173 0.9566 0.9981 0.033 0.546 
Exchange rate 
volatility sources 
- 
Mainly 
domestic 
Foreign and 
domestic, large 
share of own 
shocks 
- - 
Foreign and 
domestic, large 
share of own 
shocks 
Foreign and 
domestic, large 
share of own 
shocks 
Exchange rate 
influence on output 
and inflation 
- 
Limited Limited 
- - 
Influence on 
inflation 
Limited 
Exchange rate 
influence on monetary 
policy 
- 
On interest 
rates 
On interest 
rates and 
interventions 
- - 
Some on 
interest rates 
On interest 
rates 
Role of monetary policy in euro area shock transmission 
Output shocks 
- 
Small for 
output, 
pro-cyclical 
Small for 
inflation, 
counter-cyclical      
Small for 
output, 
counter-cyclical 
Small for 
inflation, 
counter-cyclical        
- - 
Small for 
output, 
pro-cyclical 
High for 
inflation, 
counter-cyclical       
High for 
output, 
pro-cyclical 
High for 
inflation, 
counter-cyclical 
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Inflation shocks 
- 
Small for 
output  
Small for 
inflation, 
counter-cyclical 
High for output  
Small for 
inflation, 
pro-cyclical 
- - 
High for output  
Small for 
inflation, 
pro-cyclical 
Small for 
output  
Small for 
inflation, 
counter-cyclical 
Monetary policy 
shocks 
- 
High for 
output, 
counter-cyclical 
Small for 
inflation, 
counter-cyclical 
High for 
output, 
pro-cyclical 
Small for 
inflation, 
pro-cyclical 
- - 
Low for output, 
pro-cyclical 
Small for 
inflation, 
pro-cyclical 
High for 
output, 
pro-cyclical 
Small for 
inflation, 
pro-cyclical 
Appendix – changes in transmission mechanism after loss of independent monetary policy 
Output shocks 
- 
Closer gap 
No change in 
adjustment 
Wider gap 
No change in 
adjustment 
 - 
Wider gap 
Adjustment 
change for 
worse 
Wider gap 
(output), closer 
gap (inflation) 
Adjustment 
change for 
better 
Inflation shocks 
- 
Closer gap 
(output), wider 
gap (inflation) 
No change in 
adjustment 
Closer gap 
Slight change 
in adjustment – 
for better 
- - 
Wider gap 
Adjustment 
change for 
worse 
Closer gap 
No change in 
adjustment 
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Monetary policy 
shocks 
- 
Closer gap 
(output), no 
change 
(inflation) 
No change in 
adjustment 
Closer gap 
Slight change 
in inflation 
adjustment – 
for better 
- - 
Closer gap 
(output), wider 
gap (inflation) 
Adjustment 
change for 
worse 
Wider gap 
(output), closer 
gap (inflation) 
Slight change 
in adjustment 
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